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Introduction 
 
1.1 Abstract 
 
In 2006, FIFA announced Brazil as the host of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. To heighten 
security measures for the Cup, the Rio de Janeiro state government created the Unidade de 
Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit or UPP) to regain territorial control of poor 
communities – called favelas – that were governed by criminal groups in the government’s 
absence. The UPPs diverge from traditional policing practices as they utilize proximity policing 
in favelas to create a more permanent presence with the hope of eliminating drug traffickers and 
generating trusting relationships with the communities they serve. The implementation of the 
UPP has failed because UPPs decrees conceptualize the program within existing police structures 
and rely on the same policing methods used in the past. While the UPPs have successfully 
fulfilled their goal to reduce some forms of lethal violence in favelas, it has been unsuccessful in 
establishing positive relationships between residents and police that allow for the complete 
integration of favelas into Rio de Janeiro society. Despite this imperfect and incomplete 
integration, favela residents have made their voices heard, thus increasing their participation in 
civil society and opening a necessary social discourse about police expectations and inequality. I 
argue that the UPPs, although a short-term strategy, must implement stronger institutional 
organization and social programming to change policing methods and positively impact the 
favela communities.  
 
1.2 War and Peace in Rio de Janeiro 
 
In the moment in which this sentence was written, the cracks and booms of explosions 
from bombs and guns ricochet through the streets of Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The 
local news reports the police have mistaken an innocent resident of Pavão-Pavãozinho, a nearby 
favela, for a traficante (drug trafficker). The residents of the favela then set fire to the entrance of 
the favela to protest the killing of another member of their community. The police, in the midst 
of the confusão (confusion), are trying to control the unruly members who are shown bolting 
among tightly packed barracos (poorly constructed homes found within the favela). The female 
news anchor discusses the scene on Rua Sá Ferreira, a well-known street in the affluent 
neighborhood of Copacabana, where police officers roam holding large weaponry. The second 
half of the television screen contains overhead camera shots, provided by an encircling news 
helicopter, showing the burning fires lit within the favelas. Two of my roommates stand erect at 
the nearest window, watching the windows of the nearby building illuminate with the light from 
discharged bombs and bullets. We live on Rua Sá Ferreira. My other roommate points toward the 
screen and out our apartment window amid explicative exclamations of fear and says, “O país da 
Copa!” translated “the country of the World Cup.” 
 
A history of tension between the Brazilian government and Brazilian citizens, especially 
those of the lower classes, manifests in the clashes between the Brazilian police and those who 
live in favelas, otherwise know as “slum” communities in Brazil.1 This relationship of violence 
                                                
1 This historic relationship first began with the creation of the favelas in the early 1900s and intensified through the 
military dictatorship with the increased corruption of Brazilian police forces and the widening wealth disparity 
between Brazilians themselves. This relationship has been further strained with the omnipresence of the upcoming 
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and crime between favela residents and the police, left untouched for years, has gained 
international recognition within the past decade with the announcement of the 2014 FIFA World 
Cup, to be held throughout the country in June and July of 2014. The World Cup, as a mega-
event, poses several consequences for the host country but primarily causes the unnatural sped-
up process of development of particular regions within host countries. The pressure from both 
FIFA and the Cup’s international audience historically has led to the host country’s drastic 
overspending on construction and preparations to host the tournament. The Brazilian government 
is unique in that its expenditure surpasses any that proceeded it, currently exceeding RS $14 
billion in costs, as of 2013. This expenditure, mostly concentrated on the renovation and 
construction of old and new soccer stadiums, includes various security measures to alleviate the 
pervasive concern of the general security for incoming international tourists to the various 
stadiums and the most prominent city for the Cup, Rio de Janeiro. On top of the already required 
FIFA-approved security measures, including the selection and screening of security officers by 
FIFA itself despite the fact the cost of such security falls to the responsibility of Brazil, the state 
government of Rio de Janeiro has created and started to implement the Unidade de Polícia 
Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit, UPP) to address the violent interaction between Brazil’s 
police and favela residents. The UPP continues alienate and exclude residents throughout the 
“pacification” process. This “us vs. them” exclusion, perpetuated by the Brazilian government, 
media, and people against favela residents, treats favela residents as if they were insurgents who 
invaded and disrupt Rio society.  
 
 The lines between wartime and peacetime are increasingly blurred in the context of the 
ongoing struggle between police and favela residents because of the inherent contradiction of the 
implementation of “pacification” units in what was already supposedly a time of peace.2 This 
contradiction of “pacification,” however, is a necessary acknowledgement of the ongoing yet 
undeclared war occurring throughout all of Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil.   
 
Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, the settings of warlike peacetimes, provide worthy examples of 
this tension between war and peace. Only 3% of the world’s population lives in Brazil, yet 11% 
of the world’s homicides occur there.3 Brazil recorded 47,236 homicides in 2012, placing it as 
the seventh most violent nation in the world, ahead of countries such as Somalia, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan.4 The following year, the Brazil Public Security Yearbook found that the homicide 
rate increased by 12% with 53,646 reported homicides, or one person every ten minutes.5 
Brazilian police, between 2009 and 2013, killed more than 11,000 people, or about six people a 
day. If you apply these same trends to the homicide rate in 2009 (estimated around 40,500), 2010 
                                                                                                                                                       
mega-events of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, as the Brazilian government attempts to 
quickly repair a long-standing interaction plagued by sporadic violence and unreliability. 
2 Chris Coulter, Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives through War and Peace  
and Sierra Leone (Cornell University Press, 2009). 
3 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 2: From Dictatorship to Drug War,” 
RioOnWatch, March 5, 2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=13724.	   
4 Mauricio Moura, “UPP's (Pacifying Police Units): Game Changer?” (paper presented at the “Is Rio’s Tough Love 
Strategy Against Violence Working?” at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., 
December 13, 2011).  
5 Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Forúm Brasileira de Segurança Pública, no. 8 (2004). 
http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/produtos/anuario-brasileiro-de-seguranca-publica/8o-anuario-brasileiro-de-
seguranca-publica.  
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(estimated around 41,700), and 2011 (approximately 43,690 homicides), and then add the 2012 
and 2013 homicides to these figures, there are approximately 227,000 total homicides in Brazil 
between 2009 and 2013. 6 Of these estimated 227,000 homicides, the 11,000 police killings 
constitute nearly 5% of the homicide rate.7 This calculation, of course, assumes all police killings 
were included in the original recorded homicide rates, and does not account for the possibility 
that some police killings may not be officially recorded. Within Brazil, Rio de Janeiro state has 
the highest per capita rate of killing.8 Between the years of 1991 and 2007, Rio reported an 
average of 6,826 homicides per year. These numbers rival “urban areas of countries in civil 
war.”9 There is no declared war in Rio de Janeiro or the country of Brazil, but the homicide rates 
indicate a different narrative of an unspoken and ongoing conflict.  
 
The police play a prominent role in this undeclared war and the resulting social 
exclusion, further demonizing favela residents as an entire population of criminals. The police 
are the first line of government most citizens interact with on a daily basis, and in the favelas of 
Rio, the police were the only government representatives intervening in these regions. 
Considering the police stood between the favelas and the government, they do not properly 
represent nor appropriately reflect the capabilities of the government, often participating in 
corruptive and illegal partnerships alongside taking punishment into their own hands through 
extrajudicial actions. Specifically in the favelas, the police reaffirmed the undeclared presence of 
war through their increasingly militarization and inconsistent interference, “invading” favelas 
only to shoot potential criminals and then leaving after the bloodshed. The favelas became not 
only the cause of war, but also the stage. It is within this context the Rio de Janeiro state 
government declared the creation of the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification 
Unit or UPP) in 2008, following FIFA’s announcement that Brazil was to host the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup.  
 
Research Methodology 
 
 When I traveled to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in April 2014 to research the implementation 
and reception of the UPP before the kick-off of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, I had three primary 
research questions: How does the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora in the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro affect the relationships of these communities with the government and those who do not 
live in the favelas? How has the implementation of the UPP influence the undeclared rhetoric of 
war, and does the UPP help integrate favelas into the larger Rio de Janeiro society? To answer 
these questions, I visited three favelas and interviewed government officials, favela residents, 
and scholars over a six-week period before the beginning of the World Cup in June 2014. 
 
 The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, or Police Pacification Unit (UPP), is a special unit 
within the Rio de Janeiro state government police force. The UPP is a new type of police force 
                                                
6 Calculated with information that the homicide rate increased 7.5% between 2011 and 2012, resulting in an 
approximate 43,690 homicides in 2011.   
7 Based on the 7.5% increase from 2011 to 2012 and the 12% increase between 2012 and 2013, I safely assumed 
there had been no increase in the homicide rate from 2008 to 2009, and then 3% increase from 2009 to 2010, and 
4.5% from 2010 to 2011. 
8 “Brazil police kill six people a day - NGO,” BBC News, November 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-30015465. 
9 Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 2: From Dictatorship to Drug War.”  
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called a “pacification unit,” which aims to eliminate the criminal groups in favelas and create a 
more permanent government presence. The UPP was created as a unit within the Military Police, 
another policing unit operated by state forces. The UPP is unique in its proximity policing 
approach, and it is the first government-sponsored change in policing. The UPP is also 
revolutionary in its specific officer training, the less warlike weaponry used by the forces in 
comparison to other units, and the frame that “violence is an emergency measure rather than a 
first resort.”10 The officers themselves are also younger, new recruits with the goal to “limit links 
to the corrupt practices of previous police generations.”  
 
The implementation of the UPP has failed because UPPs decrees conceptualize the program 
within existing police structures and rely on the same policing methods used in the past. The 
UPP has not sufficiently changed the attitudes of both sides and has contributed to the negative 
perceptions through the UPP’s use of militarization within proximity policing and the absence of 
social programming in its agenda and practices. Despite this imperfect and incomplete 
integration, favela residents have made their voices heard, thus increasing their participation in 
civil society and opening a necessary social discourse about police expectations and inequality. 
Due to this incorporation of favelas on residents’ terms, the UPP is a necessary step to repair the 
relationship between the government and the favelas. To be truly effective and properly represent 
and serve favela populations, the UPP must continue to evolve into a community policing force 
that incorporates the provision of social programming and public services. 
 
In Chapter 2, I provide a brief history of the favelas and occupants before the creation of the 
UPP to provide the comparative framework necessary to analyze the effect of the UPP on these 
communities. In Chapter 3, I introduce the UPP and its conceptualization through the analysis of 
various government decrees, emphasizing early indications of potential shortcomings. In Chapter 
4, I discuss the second phase of the UPP’s creation: the implementation of the UPP in favelas. I 
first address how the UPP is supposed to be implemented according to the regulations and then 
compare this procedure to two case studies of favelas that have experienced or are experiencing 
pacification. In Chapter 5, I analyze the initial consequences of the UPP in relation to its effects 
on violence rates, the most frequently analyzed data in respect to the UPP. In Chapter 6, I focus 
on the second part of the UPP’s implications and consequences: the provision of services. I 
emphasize how these services differ and how the UPP does or does not encourage their 
provision. I then conclude in Chapter 7 with my overall evaluation of the UPP program alongside 
various recommendations for the UPP and an analysis of the UPP as a model for other countries.   
                                                
10 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 3: Community Policing,” RioOnWatch, March 
22, 2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14055. 
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Chapter 2: A Rio de Janeiro “favela” 
 
To understand the effects of the UPP, we must first understand how the favelas fit into 
Rio de Janeiro society before its conception and implementation. This includes their history and 
definition as “slums,” their social and economic standing, and the primary actors involved in 
these communities.  
 
2.1 Favelas as “slums” 
 
The word “favela” in Portuguese translates to “slum.” Favelas are prevalent throughout 
the country, yet their highest concentration is in large, urban areas. The largest groupings of 
favelas are in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. In Rio, favelas are particularly unique in 
their construction on the hillsides that loom over the city. Next to some of the richest and most 
popular vacations spots in Brazil – and also in the world – favelas embody the reality of wealth 
disparity and inequality that cannot be ignored.  
 
Brazil’s favelas are some of the oldest megaslums in the world. While most megaslums 
began in the 1960s, the first favela, Morro de Providência, was founded in Rio in the 1880s.1 
Similar to slums, the Official Bulletin of the Brazilian Secretariat of Social Services defines a 
favela as a “group of dwellings with high density of occupation, the construction of which is 
carried out in a disorderly fashion with inadequate material, without zoning, without public 
services, and on land which is illegally being used without the consent of the owner.”2 Despite 
Brazil’s recent emergence out of the “third world,” 22% of Rio citizens live in favelas, and 6.5 to 
24% of those residents live on “less than the Brazilian minimum wage of about US$300 per 
month.”3 The majority of favela residents have darker skin color and would be considered black 
by the U.S. American definition, but due to the looser definition of race in Brazil, cannot be 
holistically grouped as “black.”4 While favelas may not be racial ghettos, they certainly indicate 
the unequal racial climate of Brazilian society despite its claim to be a “racial democracy.”  
 
Despite their long histories, favelas and their residents are still not welcome into the fold 
of larger Brazilian society. Favelas are strongly associated with the underclass, and middle class 
Brazilians and police often view them as the “seedbeds of crime and the homes of drug gangs” 
and treat residents as possible suspects of undefined crimes.5 The 1979 Official Bulletin first 
                                                
1 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (Verso, 2007), 27. 
2 Janice Perlman, Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (University of California 
Press: 1980), 93. 
3 “Is Rio's Tough Love Strategy Against Violence Working?” Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars Brazil Institute (January 2012), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Is%20Rio%27s%20Tough%20Love%20Strategy%20Against%20Vi
olence%20Working,%20Final.pdf; Jay Forte, “Militia Gangs Control Nearly Half of Rio Favelas,” The Rio Times, 
December 10, 2013, http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/local-politics-rio-politics/militia-gangs-
control-nearly-half-of-rio-favelas/.    
4 This definition is handed down from the legal definition of race prevalent in the American south before the Civil 
War and during segregation. Known as the “one drop rule,” this racial classification implies that any person with 
any African ancestry or with “black blood” is considered “black.” 
5 Alan Gilbert, “The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter?” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 31, no. 4 (2007): 697-713, doi:  10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00754.x.  
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defined favelas as “irregular agglomeration of sub-proletarians with no professional capacities, 
low living standards, illiteracy, messianism, promiscuity, alcoholism, the habit of going barefoot, 
superstition and spiritualism, lack of healthy recreation, refuge for criminals and marginal types, 
and spreader of parasites and contagious diseases.”6 The public often spoke about the favelas as 
“social cancers” that despoil “one of the most beautiful landscapes of the planet” and are filled 
with “rebels and gangsters.” This otherization of the favela through association with criminality 
generated tangible discrimination in Brazilian society. When surveyed in 1979 in regards to 
xenophobic impact, 59% of favela residents believed “those who live in communities in the 
urban periphery are discriminated against.” Among this 59%, 32% believed they were 
discriminated against because of their skin color, 30% because they live in a favela, 20% because 
they are poor, and 8% because of their attire.7 Interviews conducted by Perlman in 2011 confirm 
the continuation of this discrimination, finding that 92% of interviewees mentioned living in a 
favela and skin color as “bases of discrimination.”8 2013 surveys also revealed residents believe, 
“an address in a favela often means that they do not get the job.”9  
 
As a result of these negative connotations, using the term favela has generated public 
resistance through the creation and use of other names for the communities. The specific rhetoric 
used to discuss the relationship between police and the favela communities further reflects 
ongoing discriminatory policy practiced throughout Brazilian society. More than ever, favelas 
imply criminality, despite the fact that the government neglected these communities and thus 
welcomed the presence of illicit trade and criminal groups. In direct response to negative 
association of the term favela, residents now use the terms comunidade (community) or morro 
(hill) to refer to their hillside communities. The term morro is often used in direct comparison to 
asfalto (asphalt), used to describe the non-favela communities of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The 
morro/asfalto distinction also directly implicates the growing wealth disparity between the rich 
and the poor, as the asfalto references the infrastructure of roads as a signifier of affluence in 
contrast to the unpaved and hazardous roads characteristic of favelas.  
 
Favela residents are also changing the way they self-identify. In the past, the public often 
referred to residents of favelas as favelados, however, the term favelado immediately associates 
the resident as defined by his or her less privileged social identity that comes prepackaged with a 
reputation of criminality. A favelado is “not just someone who lives in a favela, he or she is 
thought to be someone who deserves to live there.”10 Many residents, in an effort to resist both 
favela and favelado, now call themselves membros da comunidade (“members of the 
community”) or moradores (“occupants”), a term that cleverly plays off the idea of occupying 
space and also includes the word morro rather than favela within its pronunciation. Favelas are 
further associated with the term marginal, which carries a slightly different connotation in 
Portuguese than in English. In Portuguese, calling someone else marginal implies a criminal 
connection. This twisting of the original definition of the word “marginal” to include criminal 
                                                
6 Perlman, Myth of Marginality, 93. 
7 Margó Hufstetlet, “More than a Quarter of Favela Residents Have Felt  
Discriminated Against,” RioOnWatch, Noember 6, 2013, http://rioonwatch.org/?p=11988. 
8 Janice Perlman, Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
155. 
9 William Garriott, Policing and Contemporary Governance: The Anthropology of Police  
in Practice (Palgrave Macmillian, 2013).  
10 Gilbert, “The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter,” 703. 
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dimensions has unavoidably generated a philosophy regarding marginalized populations, 
implying that the subsequent criminality of these isolated groups is more a reflection of 
individual choices than greater societal fissures. 
 
2.2 Actors battling over the favelas 
 
 The favelas and their residents are often assumed to be criminals because of the constant 
battle for territorial, political, and social control occurring within favela communities. There are 
three prominent actors battling for control in Rio de Janeiro favelas: the government, the police, 
and the competitive criminal groups (drug traffickers and militias). The government and the 
police, although sometimes considered one actor, are two different forces exerting separate types 
of control in favela communities. While the government has been fairly absent from favelas 
considering their origins as squatter settlements outside the rule of land and tax laws, its attempts 
for control manifest primarily in the regaining of political and territorial control of the favelas. 
The police, while not attempting to gain control for their own use separate from the government, 
play the role of the coercive apparatus that is physically present in the communities and attempts 
to deliver on the government’s agenda. Police in favelas, historically, act independently of the 
government, often establishing personal connections with local criminal groups for the collection 
of individual benefits, such as bribes and favors. The second group actor is the separate and 
competing criminal groups that rule and control favelas in the government’s absence. These 
groups prominently include drug trafficking gangs and militias, both of which opportunistically 
emphasize on the vulnerable favela population and the lack of police presence in favelas. Drug 
trafficking, as its namely implies, deals in the informal and illegal market of selling and 
packaging drugs. Drug trafficking gangs commonly fight each for territorial claims as territory 
affects the size of their market and the range of their control. The less-known but equally 
pervasive criminal group, militias, exploit favela communities by charging fees for security and 
other basic services. In the midst of these groups, the favela residents fight for autonomous rule. 
Through their own organizations, known as Residents’ Associations, they attempt to organize the 
residents to lobby for policies; however, their voices are silenced amid the noise of the more 
powerful groups. 
  
2.2.1 Government 
 
 The government at the local, state, and national levels has been absent from favela 
communities over the past century. The Brazilian federal government has refrained from 
involvement largely because of state autonomy. At the state level in Rio de Janeiro, the Rio state 
government also remained absent from favelas with the exception of police raids (invasões or 
invasions) conducted by the Rio de Janeiro Polícia Militar (Military Police or PM). These raids 
contributed to the negative relationship between favela residents and the state, as police actions, 
including “arbitrary killings and extortion,” ultimately “ensured that favela residents regarded the 
state not as an ally, but perhaps their own worst enemy.”11 The state level also features the Civil 
Police force, who was kept out of favela communities and further affirmed the invasão culture of 
the PM and its elite troops, the Special Police Operations Battalion (known as BOPE). At the 
local level, the Rio de Janeiro municipal government rarely involved itself in the favelas behind 
                                                
11 Misha Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas,” Financial Times, November 2, 2012,  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/27511af8-23b3-11e2-a46b00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wY22WrzX. 
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the argument of their criminality and the lack of resources available at the municipal level to 
combat more organized crime. The lacking government presence negated the very role of a state 
to control its repressive apparatus, or maintain a monopoly on violence within its borders. This 
absence generated vulnerable space in Brazilian society, creating power vacuums where criminal 
groups could opportunistically gain control and conduct exploitative operations that endangered 
the favela’s residents. Considering the government’s nonexistence in favelas, favela residents 
remain confident in the government, stating the most important rights of Brazilian citizens 
include the “right to support the government,” the “right to respect the authorities,” and the 
“right to obey laws.” In relation to the government’s violent relationship with the favelas, most 
surveyed residents commented that, if the government were to do something harmful to them, 
they would not be able to do anything because “the government is always right” or because they 
feared repressions actions from the state.12 These responses, rooted in fearful obedience to a 
corrupt system rather than devotion to a just one, further affirm the belief in “justiça militar,” or 
military justice executed primarily by the PM, where the justice system primarily protects the 
powerful. 
 
 The government’s role in favelas has recently changed as the municipal, state, and federal 
levels develop new focuses on favelas. The new focus includes the deployment of a new type of 
police force, called the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit or UPP). The 
UPP is primarily a Rio state government initiative, yet it is supported militarily by the federal 
government and partially partners with the municipal government.  
 
2.2.2 Police 
 
Between 2009 and 2013, Brazilian police killed more than 11,000 people, or about six 
people per day.13 With homicide rates this extreme, international audiences have recently 
questioned how Brazil’s police can commit such violence with impunity. The militarization of 
Brazilian police forces not only explains these statistics, but also provides some insight into the 
logical framework supporting the continuation of such practices. A 2009 national sample survey 
conducted by the Federal Secretary of Human Rights revealed that 40% of the Brazilian 
population believed a “good criminal is a dead criminal.”14 Police, then, are the most logical 
force to carry out this function of eliminating criminals, considering this type of death falls under 
the idea of a “normal death,” or the death of people considered undesirable because they commit 
crimes and use drugs.15 Although there seems to be ample public support for the police and their 
actions, there is significant public fear of the police. Amnesty International found that Brazil 
                                                
12 Perlman, Myth of Marginality, 188. 
13 Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Forúm Brasileira de Segurança Pública, no. 8 (2004). 
http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/produtos/anuario-brasileiro-de-seguranca-publica/8o-anuario-brasileiro-de-
seguranca-publica. 
14 Ignácio Cano (Director of Laboratório de Análise da Violência at the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro), in 
discussion with the author, May 2014. 
15 Ignácio Cano and Thais Duarte, No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro (Fundação Heinrich 
Böll: 2012), 72.  
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leads the global ranking in the public fear of police torture, where “eight in every ten Brazilians 
are afraid of being victims of torture in detention cases authorized by the police.”16 
 
Brazil’s police are inseparable from their violent history and the resulting ramifications 
that affect the forces today. Policing was first established to maintain colonial control over 
African slave populations, and then evolved to policing and suppressing the “dangerous classes” 
after abolition.17 These dangerous classes quickly became defined as the poor, who were and 
continue to be easy scapegoats for the government’s own shortcomings. The police then began to 
militarize during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, where the police forces were 
trained to repress political opposition to the regime. During this same period, death squads 
composed of police officers formed to execute prisoners and potential threats, reinforcing and 
legalizing the authoritarian nature of the police and their ruling bodies. After the fall of the 
dictatorship, the military police and its structure continued and were integrated into Brazil’s new 
electoral democratic system.  
 
Within Rio de Janeiro state, government officials began to recognize the seriousness of 
the growing powers of the criminal groups who had steadily taken control of favelas in the last 
twenty years. The first police program that attempted to correct the military culture of the police 
launched in 1991 under the supervision of the then Chief of Military Police, Nazareth Cerqueira. 
The program, named the Grupamento de Aplicação Prático-Escolar (Grouping for School-
Practice Application or GAPE), attempted to establish a constant presence in favela communities 
with a pilot program in Morro da Providência.18 However, GAPE could not compete with the 
Military Police and slowly dissolved. The next strategy began under the direction of Luiz 
Eduardo Soares in 2000, called the Grupomento de Policiamento em Areas Especiais (Grouping 
for Policing in Special Areas or GPAE). It piloted in the Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho 
favelas with the goals to “reduce access to guns and open gun carrying, steer young people away 
from a life in crime, and eliminate the violent practices of the civil and military police” and 
“[bring] the police closer to the community and to try to weed out some of the major defects 
(corruption, violence, abuse of power) which had become institutionalized within the police 
force.” GPAE also faced significant difficulties, including the inadequate training of its officers, 
the lack of police motivation, and the lack of state support. The most recent attempt at 
revolutionized policing practice began in 2008, with the introduction of a new policing 
“pacification” program: the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit or UPP). 
 
There are four police forces central to our discussion of policing history and its future in 
Rio: the Polícia Militar, the Força Nacional de Segurança Pública, the Civil Police, and the 
Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP). To begin, the Polícia Militar (Military Police or PM) is 
the most militarized of the four and is the Rio de Janeiro state force. The PM is also the largest 
group of the four, consisting of over 400,000 active members (Brazil). The PM also contains 
                                                
16 César Rosati, “8 em cada 10 brasileiros temem ser torturados pela polícia, diz pesquisa,” Folha de S.Paulo, May 
13, 2014, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/05/1453523-8-em-cada-10-brasileiros-temem-ser-
torturados-pela-policia-diz-pesquisa.shtml.  
17 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 1: 19th Century Beginnings,” RioOnWatch, 
February 18, 2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=13506.  
18 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 3: Community Policing,” RioOnWatch, March 
22, 2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14055.  
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Special Forces called the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations 
Battalion or BOPE). These forces are trained specifically in urban warfare and are known for 
their invasion operations in favela communities. The PM are criticized frequently for their lack 
of “democratic oversight,” and a 2012 U.N. Council on Human Rights report asked Brazil to 
begin to eliminate the PM.19 The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit, or 
UPP) is a new policing strategy created in 2008 within the PM that utilizes state sponsorship and 
new police officers to implement proximity policing methodology into Rio’s favelas. The second 
most militarized force is the Força Nacional de Segurança Pública (National Public Security 
Force), a federal force based in Brasilia. The third force, called the Polícia Civil (Civil Police), 
has over 123,000 members and is another state police force, but is more localized than the PM. 
Both the PM and the Civil Police are state forces, and an intense rivalry between the two groups 
exists and generates individual cultures that distrust the other.20 This competition discourages and 
disables cooperation between the forces, further exacerbating the efficiency of the police as a 
collective unit.  
 
2.2.3 Criminal Groups 
  
 Criminal groups developed as opportunistic products of the lack of public security 
plaguing favela communities. These groups, in the government absence, have transformed into 
“dangerous substitutes for the state resources chronically lacking in the city’s poor 
communities.”21 These groups then take on the role of local dono, or boss, who establishes a 
local order, a social order, and control the territory.22 The maintenance of this order is reinforced 
by extrajudicial violence carried by each group, used to punish those who break their rules or to 
resolve conflicts within their territories. Any armed group, whether it be drug trafficking gangs, 
militia, or another group with territorial domination submits favela residents to its control and 
forces them to avoid linhas vermelhas, or “red lines,” drawn to deter interference with the 
groups’ criminal interests.23 This system perpetuates fear among favela residents, terrorizing 
them with the constant threat of unintentionally crossing the line. Both groups avoid or pay off 
state forces, such as the police, to assure these state actors do not endanger their operations.24  
 
Criminal Group A: Traficantes (Drug Traffickers) 
  
 The first and most frequently mentioned violent group present in favelas is drug 
trafficking gangs, or traficantes. The most well-known and widespread gangs include Amigos 
                                                
19 Carta Capital, “UN Countries Recommend Abolition of Brazil’s Military Police," RioOnWatch, March 25, 2013, 
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=7993.  
20 “Urban Crime and Violence: Combating Citizens' Sense of Insecurity,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars Brazil Institute, Thinking Brazil Newsletter no. 21 (May 2006), 5, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/urban-crime-and-violence-brazil-combating-citizens-sense-insecurity.   
21 Monte Reel, “In Rio's Slums, Militias Fuel Violence They Seek to Quell,” The Washington Post, March 28, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702337.html.  
22 Cano and Duarte, No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro, 86. 
23 Ignácio Cano, Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia 
Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro, (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Maio 2012), 130.  
24 One interviewee stated militias request residents to speak with the ruling militia rather than the local police forces 
when conflict arises, and that if a resident does not follow this unwritten rule, the militia will come to your home and 
question why you went to the police. Cano and Duarte, No Sapatinho, 69. 
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dos Amigos (Friends of Friends or ADA), the Comando Vermelho (Red Command), and the 
Terceiro Command (Third Command). These three groups more predominantly display 
characteristics of organized crime, as their central bodies are more structured and hierarchical as 
they stretch across multiple communities. The majority of traficantes, even if they do identify as 
ADA, Comando Vermelho, or Terceiro Comando, more closely resemble smaller-scale drug 
operations without ties across favelas. Sharing a gang name does not necessarily imply organized 
and systemic drug production and trade across communities and may only come into play in 
times of territorial disputes, which often occur between gang names rather than between cohorts 
under the same name (for example, ADA and Terceiro Comando may dispute territory, but ADA 
in favela A will most likely not fight ADA from favela B). These traficante groups are much 
more fractured and unstable, leading them to maintain lower levels of organization and smaller 
chains of command that usually originate and pull members from one favela for that specific 
favela’s operations. In terms of the presence of drug trafficking groups, 2013 data cited that 37% 
of Rio favelas were still controlled by drug traffickers.25 
 
Criminal Group B: Milícias (Militias) 
 
 The second major criminal group present in favelas is the milícias, or militias. Ignácio 
Cano defines militias with five central characteristics: 1) they exert territorial domination over 
the population in areas suppressed by irregularly armed groups, 2) they cause duress among the 
favela population, 3) they are motivated by individual profit as their central element, 4) they 
legitimize themselves as positive alternatives to the drug traffic through the introduction of a 
protective order, and 5) they include the public participation of armed agents of the state in 
commanding positions.26 Militias wield considerable amounts of political power, as their 
operations rely heavily on political favors and interests with the state government as they 
maintain direct relationships with representatives in public power in exchange for favors and 
interests integrated with the legislative and justice systems.27 The political influence of militia 
members can be traced to their membership profile. The majority of their members are current 
and former members of the Polícia Militar, firefighters, Civil Police, military men, correctional 
officers, and private security workers.28 Militia members – while including some favela residents 
– are older, more professional and, because they are former state agents, are more likely to be 
officially trained in combat and have an extensive knowledge of weaponry.29 Beyond political 
influence, militias also retain and nurture ties with police. 
 
 
                                                
25 Jay Forte, “Militia Gangs Control Nearly Half of Rio Favelas,” The Rio Times, December 10, 2013, 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/local-politics-rio-politics/militia-gangs-control-nearly-half-of-rio-
favelas/. 
26 Cano and Duarte, No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro, 15. 
27 Graciano Lourenço Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na 
Cidade do Rio de Janeiro,” (Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, 2012). 
28 Reel, “In Rio's Slums, Militias Fuel Violence They Seek to Quell”; Cano and Duarte, No Sapatinho: A evolução 
das milícias no Rio de Janeiro, 13; Marco Antônio Martins, “Operação prende 16 pms no rio, entre eles, 
comandante de batalhao,” Folha de S. Paulo, October 9, 2014, 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/10/1529828-operacao-prende-16-pms-no-rio-entre-eles-comandante-
de-batalhao.shtml.  
29 Cano and Duarte, No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro, 81. 
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2.2.4 Residents 
 
 The last and most important group present in favelas is the residents themselves. While 
the favelas themselves are geographic locations, the people who live there shaped them as 
“favelas” more than any definition handed down from the government. Despite their intrinsic 
influence on the development of favela culture and its impact on the rest of Rio society, residents 
were frequently evicted from their informal settlements as they were systemically destroyed later 
in the 20th century. In response to these attacks and the lack of basic public services, the 
Federation of Residents’ Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ) was created in 
1975 after the combination of the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.30 The Residents’ Associations, 
essentially self-appointed governments created within each favela community, attempt to provide 
autonomy to favelas while also bridging the gap between residents’ demands and organizations 
that help provide them. Residents’ Associations became necessary because favela residents did 
and do not trust the government or the police to represent them or their needs. This is attributable 
to their historically violent interaction with the BOPE, the fact that Rio police only solve about 
3% of reported murders, and the widespread vision the police exist to protect the rich.31  
 
 Prior to the introduction of the UPP, residents tended to accept the violent policing in 
favela as a constant reality with little hope the situation could drastically change. While culture 
thrived in favelas, the security of residents did not. The UPP has unintentionally begun to slowly 
change this discourse, inadvertently encouraging favela residents to participate in civil society 
and demand public security – and thus better policing – as a basic human right. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Prior to the UPP, favelas were already marginalized within Rio de Janeiro society. The 
absence of formal state influence in favelas led to the intervention of other groups, including the 
police and criminal factions, who exploited the favelas and their residents for their own benefit. 
It is within this context the UPP was created and continues to be implemented, inevitably 
shaping its structure and effectiveness. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 The history and function of Residents’ Associations as a branch of civil society is a potential topic for future 
study. 
31 Janice Perlman, Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge of Rio de Janeiro (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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Chapter 3: The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora 
 
This chapter explores the conception of the UPP. The UPP was officially created and 
promulgated through a series of government decrees. The decrees themselves pose significant 
challenges to the UPP’s effectiveness, specifically because of its construction within the 
preexisting policing structure and the relatively insignificant changes in policing methodology. 
 
3.1 An Introduction 
 
 The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, or UPP, incorporates all the actors involved in the 
favelas: the government, criminal groups, the police, and the residents. The UPP’s primary goals 
include “1) To regain control of territories previously dominated by armed drug factions and 
establish democratic rule of law in those places, 2) To ensure peace for these communities, [and] 
3) To help to break the logic of war existent in the state.” Regaining territorial control, or 
retomada, is the most crucial goal of the UPP, as “the root of most of the violence is…territorial 
control.” Territorial control thus implies the expelling of criminal groups from the area and thus 
gives residents the freedom to come and leave their communities without fear. Entering a favela 
under the control of a criminal group is more difficult, as whoever wanted to enter has to receive 
approval from the local boss before entering or have a resident come down to the entrance to 
retrieve him/her. Another goal of the UPP is to improve the international perception of security 
leading to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and then 2016 Olympics.  
 
The creation of the UPP comes at Rio de Janeiro’s peak presence on the international 
stage. From 2007 to 2016, Rio planned nine international events: In 2007, the Pan-American 
Games; the 2010 5th World Urban Forum; the 2011 World Economic Forum on Latin America; 
the 2012 Rio+20 campaign; the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup; the 2014 FIFA World Cup; the 
2014 World Youth Day; the 2015 celebration of Rio’s 450th year; and the 2016 Olympic and 
Paraolympic Games.1 Although bringing the global population to Rio promised increased 
exposure and tourism, it also required a critical analysis of the state of Rio’s security issues and 
how they impacted the possibility of both drawing and then hosting an international audience. 
Favelas quickly became the focal point of this discussion, posing as both “aesthetic staging” and 
safety problems. The former, aesthetic staging, speaks to the literal high visibility of favelas and 
what they represent: crime, poverty, inequality, and bad governance.2 The latter, the safety 
situation, further builds off the “semantic link between crime and favela” prevailing among the 
international audience, fostered primarily by internationally acclaimed films such as the City of 
God (2003) and Tropa da Elite (2007). Outside of reports, statistics of violence, and these 
portrayals of favelas, the international community has little knowledge of favelas. Considering 
the widespread reputation of favelas, the UPP policy also aimed to quell fears and the 
                                                
1 Eduarda de La Rocque and Petras Shelton-Zumpano, “The Sustainable Development Strategy of the Municipal 
Government of Rio de Janeiro” (paper presented at the “Citizen Security in Brazil: Progress and Challenges” at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., March 28, 2014), 3. 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Paper_%20La%20Rocque%20and%20Shelton-
Zumpano_2014_0.pdf.  
2 Malte Steinbrink, “Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging - the example of Rio de 
Janeiro,” Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 144, no. 2 (November 2013), 
http://www.academia.edu/3990824/Festifavelisation_mega-events_slums_and_strategic_city-
staging_the_example_of_Rio_de_Janeiro.  
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“journalists’ and international guests’ feeling of security that is crucial for the success of the 
event[s]” by reaffirming the presence of tightened security policies. 
 
Out of all the events planned for Rio, the mega events – the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 
the 2016 Olympics – are the best explanation for why the UPP was finally created and then 
implemented in Rio with state government support. Although these other events held significant 
weight for the UPP’s creation, the “timetable and the initiation date of the programme clearly 
indicate… [it] is primarily a security programme for the coming mega-events.” This timeline 
holds true: FIFA announced Brazil as the 2014 World Cup host on October 30th, 2007, and the 
Rio state government quickly announced and implemented the first pilot program in the Santa 
Marta favela on December 19th, 2008. 
 
Outside of the mega events, other structural and cumulative factors contributed to the 
UPP’s creation. First, the 2007 Pan-American Games catalyzed the string of new security 
policies, alongside “sanitation, forced eviction, repression and criminalization of social 
movements and of poverty” efforts, which “has since been exacerbated by the upcoming 
realization of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.”3 In response to the 2007 
Games and the announcement of mega events, public perception also changed about “how the 
police should deal with the favelas, media support, and the announcement that Rio would be host 
to the World Cup and Olympic Games.”4 Another key factor impacting the UPP’s creation was 
Brazil’s flourishing economy and expanding role in the global market, resulting in “intense 
pressure from human rights groups” to address the poverty and living conditions of favela 
residents. The last contributing factor was a change in the political climate because of the strong 
presence of the Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) in the Rio de Janeiro mayor and governor 
offices alongside the presence of the Workers’ Party (PT) in the Brazilian presidential office, the 
PMDB’s strong ally. This allowed for political alignment and the opportunity space for Eduardo 
Paes and Sérgio Cabral – Rio de Janeiro mayor and governor respectively– to collaborate and 
create the UPP program.	   
 
3.2 The UPP Structure 
 
 The UPP is monumental in that it is the first proximity policing strategy with official 
government sponsorship and support. The UPP was first established through a series of decrees 
drafted and signed by Sérgio Cabral, the Rio state governor, and José Mariano Beltrame, the Rio 
secretary of public safety.5 These decrees, official state government documents (Decreto) and 
military police announcements (Bola da PM) attempt to incrementally create a structure for the 
UPP, despite its implementation before many of these outlines were generated. 
 
Sérgio Cabral released the first decree, Decreto 41.650 or Bola da PM n° 012, on January 
21st, 2009. This decree establishes the UPP under the Military Police, placing the pilot program 
                                                
3 Justiça Global, “Institutional Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro,” Universal Periodic Review (June 
2012), published online November 28, 2011, 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session13/BR/JG_UPR_BRA_S13_2012_JusticaGlobal_E.pdf.  
4 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 3: Community Policing.” 
5 Misha Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas,” Financial Times, November 2, 2012,  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/27511af8-23b3-11e2-a46b00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wY22WrzX. 
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under official state decree even though it was released over one month after the pilot 
implementation in Santa Marta on December 19th, 2008. Decreto 41.650’s most important detail 
highlights how the UPP fills a need of the Military Police as “a specialized and technically 
prepared and adaptable troop to conduct special operations concerning pacification and the 
maintenance of public order in poor communities.”6 The second decree, Decreto 41.653 or Bola 
da PM n° 013, also signed by Sérgio Cabral, quickly amends the previous decree to explain how 
UPP officers will be compensated within the new system. This specific decree attempts to 
remedy the historically poor treatment and inadequate pay of Brazil’s police (around 400 reais 
per month or US$200), making them more susceptible to accepting bribes and relying on 
payouts.7 The next official document was not released as an official decree of Cabral, but rather a 
Military Police Bulletin, Bola da PM nº 022 05, on February 5th, 2009. This bulletin reinforces 
the powers of individual commanders within individual UPP units stationed within specific 
communities, and adds structure to the UPPs based on structure already present in the PM. 
 
Cabral did not release the next decree, Decreto 42.787, until January 6th, 2011, nearly two 
years after the last document. This decree more concretely describes the implementation process, 
the structure, and the mission of the UPP. It specifically establishes the four aspects of the UPP: 
1) as a proximity police force, 2) the target of the UPP forces as “poor communities, with little 
institutionalization and a large degree of informality where well-armed criminal groups 
opportunistically combat the state’s democratic rule of law,” 3) the objectives of the UPP to 
“consolidate state control over communities that are under the strong influence by armed 
criminal groups” and “return the local population to peace and tranquility necessary for the 
public exercise of full citizenship to guarantee both social and economic development,” and 4) 
the four steps to pacification. While the defining characteristics of the UPP are important, the 
four steps to pacification more thoroughly explain how the UPP is to act as a proximity police 
force, interact with the communities which it serves, and meet its objectives. The four steps 
provide a holistic view of the “pacification” process: tactics, stabilization, UPP implementation, 
and evaluation and monitoring.8  
 
Step 1: Tactics 
 
 The primary step to the UPP program is to “regain state control over areas illegally 
subjugated to armed, criminal groups.”9 To regain territorial control, the decree names the BOPE 
                                                
6 Governo Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Decreto No. 41.650: Dispõe sobre a criação da Unidade de Polícia 
Pacificadora – UPP e dá outras providêncas,” by Sérgio Cabral, Rio de Janeiro, 2009, 
http://www.imprensaoficial.rj.gov.br/portal/modules/conteudoonline/view_pdf.php?ie=NDMyOA==&ip=NA==&s=
NDA0M2RhZGM4NmE5ZmQ3NmFmNTQ0MDY5OWM5MzZhOWM.  
7 Perlman, Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge of Rio de Janeiro.  
8 Articles 3-11 in Decreto 42.787 are also noteworthy but not crucial to our complete understanding of the UPP. 
Article 3 establishes the various attributes and responsibilities of UPP commanders to  “I. coordinate, control and 
prepare doctrine and operations of the UPP… II. plan the implementation of new UPPs… [and] III. establish guiding 
principles to standardize police procedures.” Article 4 establishes the administrative branch of the UPP. Article 5 
establishes ranking within the UPP. Article 6 reaffirms UPP payment. Article 7 establishes testing guidelines for 
potential UPP officers. Article 8 places any still-existing GPAE programs under the UPP. Articles 9 and 10 establish 
the biannual monitoring of UPP activities by Secretary of State Security, the General Commander of the Military 
Police and Coordinator of the UPP, the Instituto de Segurança Pública. Lastly, Article 11 states the Secretary of 
State Security is responsible for establishing new UPP programs guidelines. 
9 See Decreto 41.650, Article 2. 
19 
 
as the force to initially invade into the favela. The entrance of the BOPE is meant to represent 
“the national flag” and the “reoccupation of national territory that had been under the power of 
the enemy.”10 Before the BOPE invasion, the invasion is announced to the community in an 
attempt to entice criminals to leave before the actual assault, making the invasion less 
confrontational. The police themselves refer to this strategy as guerra avisada, or “advised war,” 
which both acknowledges the presence of war in the territories and attempts to approach that war 
with more care. 
 
 This strategy is problematic because the BOPE is the epitome of police violence in 
favelas. The residents’ perception of police has been shaped by their violent and sporadic 
interactions with the BOPE, leading to the vast distrust of the police in poor communities. The 
UPP’s peace process essentially begins with the historical perpetrator of war in these areas, and 
has caused suspicion among residents of the UPP program as a whole.  
 
Step 2: Stabilization 
 
 The second step of the program, or the stabilization phase, prepares for the entrance of 
the UPP. Stabilization, however, is not well defined, and there is no prescriptive description of 
what stabilization should look like or include. This space, open for interpretation, has allowed 
military intervention to occur with Força Nacional de Seguridade troops, specifically in larger 
favelas such as Complexo de Alemão and Complexo da Maré. The Força Nacional occupied 
both of these communities during the occupation, or stabilization, period because of the “fire 
power of the factions running them.”11 In response to this firepower, military occupation often 
includes military grade weaponry.  
 
Step 3: UPP implementation 
 
The third step is the implementation of the UPP itself. The decree states that this phase 
“occurs when military police especially prepared for the exercise of proximity policing arrive 
definitively to the community, preparing for the arrival of other public and private services that 
creates the possibility for the community’s reintegration into democratic society.”12 The actual 
implementation is left vague, without details of how the UPP should enter or begin its presence 
in the community. Almost always this implementation includes the construction and then 
occupation of a UPP base located within the community itself, usually located near the entrance 
of the favela. The presence of the base is crucial to the success of the UPP as a proximity police 
force. Without a UPP base within the favela, the UPP delegitimizes itself as a competitive 
permanent presence.  
 
Step 4: Evaluation and monitoring 
 
 The final phase, evaluation and monitoring, aims to continually improve the program. 
While this step may be the most important to the success and evolution of the UPP, the decree 
                                                
10 Ignácio Cano and Eduardo Ribeiro, “Venciendo una guerra que nunca existió: La experiencia de las UPP en Río 
de Janeiro” (2011), 3.  
11 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.” 
12 Governo Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Decreto No. 41.650. 
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does not establish how evaluation will be conducted or institute a maintenance system through 
which improvements can be implemented.  
 
3.3 Policing Methodology 
 
Even before the decrees could collectively impact the structure, implementation, and 
maintenance of the UPP, the decrees themselves failed to address persistent problems within the 
police forces. By avoiding these methodological and structural issues, the UPP does not erase 
their existence, but endangers its own success. 
 
 First, the key distinction between the UPP and any previous police strategy or force is its 
proximity policing methodology. This methodology does prove to be a significant challenge, 
especially considering it is often mistaken for community policing. While no authoritative 
definition of proximity policing exists, it can be best described as a policing methodology 
centered around creating a more consistent police presence in a designated region or 
neighborhood utilizing stronger spatial proximity through more frequent or constant patrolling. 
Scholars worldwide have also attempted to better define proximity policing theory and practice. 
Andressa Somogy de Oliveira, a university student in at the State University of São Paulo, states 
the goal of proximity policing as to “standardize the actions of UPP police to guarantee 
professional behavior,” and Danish scholars describe the proximity policing practice as 
“geographic assignments and long-term affiliation with the local areas [to] provide for a 
personalization of policing.”13 Specifically applied to the UPP, the UPP attempts to standardize 
police behavior and focuses on geographic areas, alongside an augmentation of police presence 
in pacified areas. While the average ratio of inhabitant to police officer in Rio de Janeiro is 
320:1, favelas with the UPP experience a 60:1 inhabitant to officer ratio.14 Although this 
increased presence echoes a necessary characteristic of community policing, the UPP is not 
community policing. 
 
There are two reasons for the distinction between proximity and community policing: 1) 
community policing implies that police officers working their beats are “autonomous” and make 
their own decisions because the community trusts them and relates to them. The UPP does not 
encourage such strong community ties, and forfeits officer independence in favor of a more 
centralized structure underneath a commander; and 2) Community policing usually includes 
some type of forum, “or setting where the community tells the police what their priorities are in 
terms of security and then the police try to address the concerns of the community.”15 The UPP 
does not institute forums as a pillar of their interaction with favela members, and is “an 
experience brought from the outside to address the general need of pacification” rather than an 
force working with internal representatives to systematically “incorporate the needs of the 
community.” Community policing also prioritizes the social and economic development of the 
                                                
13 Andressa Somogy de Oliveira, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora: Pacificação das favelas ou higienização social?” 
(Bachelor’s degree thesis, Human and Social Sciences, Universidade Estadual Paulista, Franca, 2013); Lars 
Holmberg, “Personalized policing,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 25, no. 
1 (2002), 32-47. 
14 David Klaubert and Jan Kruger, “Armed peace,” Conta Rio, 2014, http://contario.net/armed-peace/.  
15 Ignácio Cano (Director of the LAV at UERJ), in discussion with Rio Radar, August 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdhE.  
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community through programming, while the UPP model more specifically aims to secure peace 
and therefore provide the potential opportunity for social and economic development while not 
making those improvements the direct goal. Even more specifically, the activities of many UPP 
police officers do not reflect community or proximity policing methodology. Ignácio Cano 
found, based on interviews with officers, that UPP officers spend only 5% of their time meeting 
with residents, while they spend16.2% of their time receiving visitors and tourists, and 79.4% 
detaining and interviewing suspects.16 
 
Although the UPP does spout proximity policing methodology, its decrees did not 
address or attempt to remedy the longstanding criticisms of the Military Police, including their 
violent nature, training, and militarized weaponry. Instead of rejecting Military Police practices 
in favor of new ones, the decrees structurally established the UPP under the Military Police with 
Decreto 41.650. Placing the UPP within the Military Police does provide the opportunity to 
change the police from the inside out, but it also has the potential to carry on the legacy of 
negative police practices. This fact perhaps explains the statistics collected by Ignácio Cano, who 
discovered that 74.4% of residents had negative feelings about the UPPs when they first began, 
attributing 16.9% to fear, 28.5% to distrust, and 29% to anger felt by residents. The UPP also 
places power into the hands of the UPP commanders, allowing for wide variation based on 
commander beliefs and actions (Article 3). This strategy can be beneficial by allowing individual 
solutions to fit each community, especially considering “commanders and sub-commanders 
generally possess visions of the project that reflect the official guidelines.”17  
 
At the same time, UPP commanders are former police officers who are not originally 
trained to support and perpetuate the UPP mission. Although UPP commanders are increasingly 
bred for their positions, they wield unreasonable amounts of unchecked power because of the 
lack of structure, ultimately allowing room for error based on individual variances. This lack of 
structure allow commanders to overstep UPP goals in favor of their own agenda, causing 
corruption and negative occurrences that delegitimize the UPP program. These agendas can 
include bribery schemes with criminal groups, regulations on local business, and damaging 
interpretations of how to best conduct proximity policing. 18 These interpretations are made 
possible because the UPP structure fails to definitively target any one threatening group, leaving 
decisions regarding detainment and interrogation to subjective judgment. Without a clear 
definition of what composes a “criminal group,” anyone in a favela can be a criminal even 
without substantial evidence. This logic has led to the creation of mandates that allow police to 
legally invade any home they choose in search of criminals.19 Other instances of police oversight 
have been repeatedly reported, including the aforementioned “warrantless invasion of homes” 
                                                
16 Barbara Musumeci Soares, Julita Lemgruber, Leonarda Musumeci, and Silvia Ramos, “Unidades de Polícia 
Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” (May 2011), 8.  
17 Ignácio Cano, Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia 
Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro, (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, May 2012), 136. 
18 For example, the presence of mototaxis in each community varies among favelas occupied by the UPP because of 
commander preferences. While some commanders decide the exact number of mototaxis allowed, others place no 
regulations on the business. Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 155. 
19 This happened in Complexo da Maré during the “stabilization” period of their occupation. Felicity Clarke, “Maré 
Vive: Opiniões da Comunidade Sobre a Ocupação Policial,” RioOnWatch, April 10, 2014, 
http://rioonwatch.org.br/?p=11067.  
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along with “arbitrary searches and violent confrontations.”20 With commanders at the forefront of 
each UPP unit in each individual community, the UPP risks “perpetuating traditional 
authoritarian control” present in favelas by recreating “a new local boss, substituting the figure 
associated with crime for a new one, who is invested in legality but perhaps equally harmful.”21 
Even if the power changes from donos (“bosses”) to more benign chefes (“heads”), the power 
exchange holds potential to emerge as authoritarian control. 
 
 Outside of the commanders, there is a more visible shift in the UPP methodology in 
regards to its officers. Compared to other police forces, the UPP targets younger and 
inexperienced recruits to avoid officers with previously established corrupt networks in the 
favelas. Considering their inexperience in the field, UPP officers are not sufficiently trained to 
conduct effective proximity policing. Officers first undergo six months of normal police training, 
required for most police forces, and then participate in a one or two week training specified for 
the UPP. The UPP training mainly consists of visiting UPP commanders sharing their own 
stories and aims to orient officers to the experience more than provide actual training. In the 
words of Ignácio Cano, “there’s no material” prepared for UPP training, and therefore “calling it 
training was a very generous word.”22 After this short period of preparation, UPP officers are 
then deployed in the field, expected to understand the complicated landscape of racism, historic 
violence, lack of trust in police, and wealth inequality that composes the communities they serve. 
Despite these shortcomings in their training, the UPP does maintain a cleaner image than other 
policing bodies, as 72.4% of residents interviewed believed “the UPPs have no involvement with 
corruption,” and “only 6.9% said they believe the pacifying police to be corrupt – making a stark 
break from past expectations.”23 2013 surveys conducted by the Secretary of Labor and 
Employment and the Rio de Janeiro Department of Security also revealed that 59.5% of residents 
believed the number of police officers is “adequate” or “entirely adequate.”24 In respect to 
training, 52.3% of residents surveyed believed UPP officers to be “well trained and/or very well 
trained.” While public perceptions of the UPP have changed based on the advertised differences 
between the UPP and other police forces, UPP officers remain inadequately trained for their 
difficult jobs. 
 
 The UPP also maintains methodologies prevalent within other Brazilian police forces. 
First, Brazil’s police are inadequately paid. This legacy continues in the UPP, where “58.9% of 
UPP police officers believe their salary is ‘horrible or does not exist.’”25 In the scheme of the 
negative reputation of Brazil’s police, underpaying officers is a significant factor explaining the 
widespread corruption in the forces considering most officers enter into bribery schemes to 
                                                
20 20 Justiça Global, “Institutional Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro.” 
21 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 156. 
22 Ignácio Cano (Director of LAV at UERJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014; Barbara Musumeci Soares, 
et.al, “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” 9. 
23 “Is Rio's Tough Love Strategy Against Violence Working?” Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars Brazil Institute (January 2012), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Is%20Rio%27s%20Tough%20Love%20Strategy%20Against%20Vi
olence%20Working,%20Final.pdf.  
24 Mauricio Moura, “UPP's (Pacifying Police Units): Game Changer?” (paper presented at the “Is Rio’s Tough Love 
Strategy Against Violence Working?” at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., 
December 13, 2011). 
25 Barbara Musumeci Soares, et.al, “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” 13. 
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compensate for their small salaries. Better conditions for officers, especially in the UPP, is a 
critical improvement needed to ensure the success of the program and the commitment of the 
officers to their duties as a proximity police force. Conditions appear to be so poor that, when 
interviewed regarding proposals to better the UPP as a program, 61.3% of UPP officers said they 
would “improve work conditions for the police,” while only 12.6% responded they would 
“increase social programming.”  
  
The UPP also struggles with legitimacy amongst its own officers. Many UPP officers 
expressed they would rather be stationed in a batalhão (“battalion”) of the Military Police than in 
the UPP. Research conducted in 2011 found that “70% of policeman who work in the UPPs 
would rather work in normal battalions and not the UPPs,” and one officer interviewed suggested 
this statistic of 70% is closer to 99%.26 A study conducted by the Brazil Forum found that 
officers were also reluctant to serve in more difficult “pacified” communities where violence 
continues despite UPP presence, generating a “marked antipathy of serving UPP officers toward 
their job.”27 Outside of the UPP, other police also look unfavorably on the UPP program and 
equate proximity methodology to an illegitimate and “soft” form of policing that does not 
deserve prioritization.28 Among non-UPP police, 37.4% of those interviewed believed the UPP 
was “good,” 38.9% “regular,” and 23.7% “horrible or non-existent.”29 Outside forces are also 
resentful of the UPP, considering the mass amount of resources flooding the program. Finally, 
some UPP officers feel favela residents do not respect the UPP because the UPP is seen as 
“guards” who only monitor “who enters and leaves” the favela.30 This same officer believed 
residents “have a different [and greater] respect for the Military Police” because they see them as 
“police who combat crime and all types of offenses.”  
 
 Steps 3 and 4, implementation and evaluation and monitoring phases respectively, create 
their own consequences that I will discuss in further depth in the following chapters. For the time 
being, it is important to understand how the decree recognizes these phases as preparation “for 
the arrival of other public and private services that creates the possibility for the community’s 
reintegration into democratic society,” even though the program does not intend to implement 
those services itself.31 It is clear the UPP does not intend to implement public or private services 
through the program as the decrees blatantly disregard detailing the evaluation and monitoring 
process. Although the UPP may attempt to create committees or methods of evaluation, the 
governing documents do not support a structured measurement of its progress. New programs, 
especially those addressing a historic societal issue, require institutionalized maintenance. 
Without a concrete system or methods to conduct the evaluations, programs like the UPP cannot 
adapt to changing demands to implement widespread, structural change. 
 
 
                                                
26 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 138. 
27 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.” 
28 Ignácio Cano in discussion with Rio Radar. 
29 Barbara Musumeci Soares, et.al, “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” 13. 
30 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 140. 
31 Governo Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Decreto No. 42.787: Dispõe sobre a implantação, estrutura, atuação e 
funcionamento das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) no estado do Rio de Janeiro e dá outras providências,” 
by Sérgio Cabral, Rio de Janeiro, January 2011, 
http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/DecretoSeseg42.787Upp.pdf.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The conceptualization of the UPP clearly indicates the government’s agenda to provide 
additional security in anticipation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. 
Through a small series of government decrees, the UPP is poorly structured and fails to correct 
policing methodology that does not produce healthy interaction between the police and favela 
residents. This conceptualization on paper thus troubles its implementation and expansion from 
the original pilot project. 
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Chapter 4: Implementing the UPP 
 
 The actual implementation phase of the UPP does not solely include the description of 
UPP implementation originally detailed in Decreto 42.787. The implementation, or execution, 
process as a whole refers to the execution of each step laid out by the Rio de Janeiro government, 
including the tactics used to determine which communities receive the UPP, the reality of the 
stabilization phase, the implementation of the UPP, and then the evaluation and monitoring 
maintenance to sustain the program.   
 
4.1 Locations of the UPP 
 
 In 2006, before the announcement of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, Rio de Janeiro state 
administration commented, “police operations must…effectively locate crime ‘hot spots’ through 
extensive research and analysis of crime data and statistics.”1 However, after the Cup’s 
announcement, policing practices increasingly targeted more touristy regions of the city of Rio.  
 
To better understand what regions the UPP does target, we can utilize the city’s dividing 
lines created by the Rio de Janeiro state government’s Instituto de Segurança Pública (Public 
Security Institute or ISP). The ISP divides the state of Rio into seven sections, each designated as 
their own “RISP,” or “integrated security regions” of Rio de Janeiro.2 The ISP first created 
RISPs in January 2007 alongside the creation of “AISPs,” or “integrated security areas,” which 
are smaller geographic regions located within RISPs. The designation of RISPs and AISPs aimed 
to create a more structured analysis of violence through crime statistics based on geographic 
occurrence.3 Figures 1 and 2 below list and display each region indicated by each RISP. 
 
     Figure 1 
RISP  Location (Original 
Portuguese) 
Location (English 
Translation) 
RISP 1 Capital (regiões Sul, Centro 
e Norte) 
Capital (South, Center, and 
North Zones) 
RISP 2 Capital (região Oeste) Capital (West Zone) 
RISP 3 Baixada Baixada Fluminense  
RISP 4 Niteroi e região dos lagos Niteroi and the Microlakes 
region 
RISP 5 Sul Fluminense South Fluminense 
RISP 6 Norte Fluminense North Fluminense 
RISP 7 Região Serrana Micro Serrana 
                                                
1 “Urban Crime and Violence: Combating Citizens' Sense of Insecurity,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars Brazil Institute, Thinking Brazil Newsletter no. 21 (May 2006), 5, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/urban-crime-and-violence-brazil-combating-citizens-sense-insecurity.   
2 David Klaubert and Jan Kruger, “Armed peace,” Conta Rio, 2014, http://contario.net/armed-peace/; “SESEG cria 
RISP: novo modelo de gestão em segurança pública que trabalha com sistema de metas e premiação,” 
http://www.riocomovamos.org.br/arq/SESEG_20090626.pdf.  
3 “Resumo Aisp,” Instituto de Segurança Pública, http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/resumoaisp.asp.  
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Figure 2: For purposes of this image, substitute “CPA” for “RISP.4” 
 
 RISPs are important to the implementation of the UPPs, as they indicate which areas of 
Rio the UPP targets. Since its initial implementation in 2008 in the Santa Marta favela, UPP 
units have drastically favored RISP 1 (Capital: South, Center, and North Zones). From 2008 to 
2010, the UPP installed 11 more units in RISP 1 favelas. From 2010 to 2012, 15 more UPPs 
appeared in RISP 1, and from 2012 to 2014, 12 more UPPs were installed in RISP 1 (Figure 3). 
In the same time frame, RISP 2 (West Zone) accumulated three UPP units, two of which – 
Cidade de Deus and Jardim Batan – were implemented shortly after Santa Marta in January 
2009. The third UPP unit in RISP 2 was then implemented in the Vila Kennedy favela in late May 
of 2014, over three years later. The last RISP and second-to-last UPP implementation finally 
reached RISP 3 (Baixada Fluminense) with Mangueirinha in late May of 2014.5  
 
Figure 3: Number of UPP units installed per RISP from 2008-2014 
Year RISP 1 RISP 2 RISP 3 RISP 4 Total UPPs 
2008 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 11 2 0 0 13 
2012 26 2 0 0 28 
2014 34 3 1 0 38 
 
                                                
4 “Cpa pmerj,” Wikimedia Commons, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/Cpa_pmerj.PNG.  
5 “Primeira UPP da Baixada Fluminense é inaugurada em Duque de Caxias,” O Dia, February 7, 2014, 
http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2014-02-07/primeira-upp-da-baixada-fluminense-e-inaugurada-em-
duque-de-caxias.html.  
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Favela Implementation Date RISP 
Santa Marta 12/19/2008 1 
Cidade de Deus 02/16/2009 2 
Jardim Batan 02/18/2009 2 
Babilônia e Chapéu Mangueira 06/10/2009 1 
Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo 12/23/2009 1 
Ladeira dos Tabajaras/Cabritos 01/14/2010 1 
Providência 04/26/2010 1 
Borel 06/07/2010 1 
Formiga 07/01/2010 1 
Andaraí  07/28/2010 1 
Salgueiro  09/17/2010 1 
Turano 10/30/2010 1 
Macacos  11/30/2010 1 
São João, Quieto e Matriz 01/31/2011 1 
Coroa, Fallet e Fogueteiro  02/25/2011 1 
Escondidinho e Prazeres  02/25/2011 1 
Complexo de São Carlos 05/17/2011 1 
Mangueira 11/03/2011 1 
Vidigal 01/18/2012 1 
Fazendinha 04/18/2012 1 
Nova Brasília 04/18/2012 1 
Adeus/Baiana 05/11/2012 1 
Alemão 05/30/2012 1 
Chatuba 06/27/2012 1 
Fé/Sereno 06/27/2012 1 
Parque Proletário 08/28/2012 1 
Vila Cruzeiro 08/28/2012 1 
Rocinha 09/20/2012 1 
Maguinhos 01/16/2013 1 
Jacarezinho 01/16/2013 1 
Caju 04/12/2013 1 
Barreira/Tuiuti 04/12/2013 1 
Cerro-Corá 06/03/2013 1 
Arará/Mandela 09/06/2013 1 
Lins 12/02/2013 1 
Camarista Méier 12/02/2013 1 
Mangueirinha 02/07/2014 3 
Vila Kennedy 05/23/2014 2 
Figure 4: UPP implementations in various communities. All data collected from UPP official 
website, http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp.  
  
Why does it matter the majority of UPPs units are located in RISP 1? RISP 1 is primarily 
considered the “South Zone” of Rio de Janeiro, which includes most tourist attractions, including 
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Maracanã Stadium, the Christ the Redeemer statue, and Copacabana and Ipanema beaches. The 
favelas targeted by the UPP are located where “7 percent of the population live but which 
accounts for 50 percent of the formal employment in Rio and produces 33 percent of the city's 
GDP."6 Cano further comments these locations indicate the UPP is “strongly influenced by the 
city’s mega events, beginning with the 2014 World Cup, including the area surrounding the 
stadium and the tourist areas,” and these areas within RISP 1 are located in “central areas,” 
occupied by the “middle-upper class,” and are “strategically visible” for purposes of advertising 
for the coming mega events.7 By targeting RISP 1 favelas, the UPP largely ignores the most 
violent areas of the state. Many critics of the UPP recognize this disparity and vouch for UPP 
implementation in the “areas of greatest lethality,” such as Baixada Fluminense or the West 
Zone. It is not a coincidence that most of these areas are controlled by militias. In comparison, 
drug traffickers control most of the RISP 1 favelas, as they desire to be closer to their customers: 
the wealthy. This clear separation between UPP and non-UPP favelas “leaves a dangerous 
double standard in which, in some favelas, the state promotes a peaceful solution based on 
mediation and communication, while at the same time, in others, it retains the war-like tactics 
developed by the police force over the last 50 years.”8 
 
 Of the 38 installed UPPs, only 4 are located outside of RISP 1, and each favela outside of 
RISP 1 has a legitimate reason or strategic purpose for UPP installation. Cidade de Deus, the 
second favela to receive the UPP after Santa Marta in February 2009, is the infamous favela 
featured in the 2002 internationally acclaimed film, City of God. Ignácio Cano explains Cidade 
de Deus as “a random occurrence” with the UPPs, considering a local police commander 
individually drove UPP implementation in the favela.9  However, Cidade de Deus is also located 
very closely to the Linha Vermelha, an expressway that connects downtown Rio de Janeiro to 
Barra de Tijuaca, a common tourist destination west of the South Zone of Rio. Jardim Batan, the 
third favela to receive the UPP, was also on the national and international radar. In May 2008, a 
group of militiamen tortured several journalists from the “O Dia” newspaper in Jardim Batan. In 
response to this incident, the UPP entered Batan, the only favela controlled by militia with UPP 
presence. Vila Kennedy, the most recent implementation, is also located in RISP 2 and was 
occupied in response to ongoing violent criminal group activity. Lastly, the first UPP in RISP 3, 
located in Mangueirinha, aims to displace one of the strongest drug trafficking gangs, the 
Comando Vermelho (“Red Command”), whose “most important post” was located in Baixada.10 
By moving into RISP 3, UPP forces are now attempting to target outposts based on gang activity 
itself, rather than targeting more general geographic regions located near tourist areas. 
 
4.2 Case Study A: Santa Marta  
 
 The first UPP unit was implemented in the Santa Marta favela as a pilot program on 
December 19th, 2008. Santa Marta was an ideal location for the UPP pilot for multiple reasons. 
                                                
6 Misha Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas,” Financial Times, November 2, 2012,  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/27511af8-23b3-11e2-a46b00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wY22WrzX. 
6 Perlman, Myth of Marginality, 188. 
7 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 25.  
8 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 4: Pacifying Police Units,” RioOnWatch, May 1, 
2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14728.  
9 Ignácio Cano in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
10 “Primeira UPP da Baixada Fluminense é inaugurada em Duque de Caxias.”  
29 
 
First, Santa Marta is a relatively small favela with a population of around 3,900 residents and 
1,176 homes, making the UPP an insulated and easily controllable pilot.11 Second, Santa Marta 
has defined boundaries that “provide little opportunity for territorial expansion” and complicate 
the reentrance of criminal groups as there is only one entrance into the favela and it is bordered 
by the Funicular Railway on one side, a constructed wall on the other (called the “Eco 
Barrier”12), and thick forest and rocks at the top. Third, Santa Marta already had confirmed 
tourism possibility, as tourists were already visiting the area to see the Michael Jackson statue 
erected in one of the plazas to commemorate the 1996 filming of his music video for the song, 
“They Don’t Care About Us.” Today, this particular area draws about 10,000 visitors a month.13 
Lastly, the state government had already began to expand social programming in Santa Marta 
through the State Urban Development Program, which helped install sewage, drainage and water 
distribution networks alongside “improvements in the road system, paving of public areas, 
construction of the second section of the funicular railway, slope retention works, construction of 
housing units and improvements made to existing ones.”14 In summary, Santa Marta’s popularity 
can be attributed to “its prime location, with easy access via one of the main roads in Botafogo, 
São Clemente Street; its proximity to downtown and the neighborhoods of the South Zone; [and] 
its relatively small size, with well-established borders.” Based on these factors, implementing the 
UPP in Santa Marta became an attractive possibility and reality.  
 
 Santa Marta is widely considered to be the “model UPP”; however, Santa Marta still does 
not holistically represent ideal “pacification.”15 On the one hand, violence decreased and the 
provision of social programs increased after the installation of the UPP. On the other, Santa 
Marta remains a conflicting account of cultural oppression alongside an irreconcilable increase in 
crime. Similar to other “pacified” favelas, Santa Marta has experienced heightened regulation of 
several cultural events, including the necessity of police permission to hold parties within the 
favela and events in the street. While Santa Marta may boast the aforementioned improvements, 
residents question why “there are open doors [because of police policy where they can enter any 
home without reason] and people who are hungry… For whom is this public policy?’” 
 
Santa Marta boasts a clean record: there have been no recorded homicides in Santa Marta 
since the beginning of the pacification efforts. This high ratio is explained by Santa Marta’s high 
police-to-inhabitant ratio in comparison to the rest of Rio, where Santa Marta has nearly one 
policeman for every 37 inhabitants, while the “average statewide ratio is one for every 320 
inhabitants.”16 Malgorzata Loj in his Evaluation of pacification reform in Rio de Janeiro explains 
violence overall has not necessarily decreased: “Violence [overall] has risen by 157% in 2009, 
2007% in 2010, and 214% in 2011 in relation to 2008,” while threats and disappearances also 
                                                
11 “Santa Marta,” Instituto Pereira Passos Rio+Social (2010), http://www.riomaissocial.org/territorios/santa-marta/.  
12 Fabiana Frayssinet, “Brazil: Walling Off the Slums…or ‘Eco-Barrier?’” Inter Press Service News Agency, April 
3, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/04/brazil-walling-off-the-slumsor-lsquoeco-barrierrsquo/.  
13 Jay Forte, “Santa Marta favela community in rio marks six years with UPP,” RioTimes, December 19, 2014, 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/santa-marta-community-in-rio-marks-six-years-with-upp/.  
14 Fernanda Caixeta Carvalho and Flavia Damásio Silva, “Tourism and slums: A study about Favela Santa Marta 
and the role of Pacification Police Units in Rio de Janeiro,” Cadernos Proarq 19, 2012, 
http://www.proarq.fau.ufrj.br/revista/public/docs/Proarq19_TourismSlums_CarvalhoSilva.pdf.  
15 Maré resident and UNIRIO student, in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
16 Klaubert and Kruger, “Armed peace.” 
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increased significantly – by 111% and 800% respectively – from 2008 to 2011.17 These increases 
can be misleading, as they often reflect an increase in the number of reports of violence filed by 
residents, rather than an actual increase in the occurrences of these crimes. Thus, violence rates 
may not have increased, but the reports of them have, a potential positive signal that the UPP had 
gained the public trust. This potential legitimacy of the UPP, however is again complicated by a 
survey of 100 Santa Marta residents, conducted by the Getulio Vargas Foundation in 2011 
following the implementation of the UPP, which revealed that only 18% believed the UPP was 
“adequately prepared to deal with the community’s problems.”  
 
The Santa Marta UPP program, however, did result in increased social programming. 
Following the implementation of the UPP, the State Urban Development Program was 
discontinued in 2010 but then reinstated in 2012 with R$8.1 million in funds. Alongside the 
involvement of similar programs, the territory has opened up to “visitors and residents from the 
formal city, as well as government involvement – electricity and water services are regularized, 
for example, taxes and fees are increasingly paid, and… there is greater interest in the potential 
of the community and property values.”18 The area has also increased its tourism efforts, and 
about 200 tourists visited Santa Marta daily after UPP implementation. Rio’s state government 
then launched the Rio Top Tour program, which included the formal set up of information panels 
for tour guides and monitors. This program also included the construction of the Monorail, or the 
“rail-car service located on the edge of the favela” that transports residents and tourists up and 
down the favela. Santa Marta’s cable car has also served as an example for other favelas who 
also received cable car-esque installments, including both Rocinha and Complexo de Alemão. A 
counselor of the Rio de Janeiro Engineers Club, Alcebíades Fonseca, cited that the “system 
in Santa Marta facilitates access for disabled people, allows for waste disposal and its 
construction is much cheaper, with a projected installation that corresponds to only 20% of the 
total value of the imported cable car project presented by the Rio government.”19 These services, 
while attributable to the UPP and pacification efforts, are also unique to Santa Marta: most UPPs 
do not incorporate the provision of state, public, social services into their agenda.  
 
For these reasons, Santa Marta is not necessarily a model UPP within itself, and the 
continued implementation and expansion of the UPP proves the Santa Marta “model” is not as 
universal or applicable to other favelas as originally hoped.  
 
4.3 Case Study B: Complexo da Maré 
 
 Complexo da Maré is a conglomeration of fifteen, smaller neighborhood favelas located 
in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro, thus making it the largest favela with a total population of 
130,000 residents, a total area of nearly 210,000 square meters, and more than 43,000 homes.20 
In comparison to other large favelas in Rio, Maré trumps the two other mega slums, Complexo 
                                                
17 Malgorzata Loj, “Evaluation of pacification reform in Rio de Janeiro,” (thesis for Graduate School of Social 
Science, University of Amsterdam, August 2012), http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=452492.  
18 Caixeta Carvalho and Damásio Silva, “Tourism and slums: A study about Favela Santa Marta and the role of 
Pacification Police Units in Rio de Janeiro.” 
19 Cláudia Freitas, “Rocinha and Alemão Plan to Sue the State Over Cable Car,” RioOnWatch, October 14, 2013, 
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=11466.  
20 “Bairros Cariocas,” Rio Prefeitura, http://portalgeo.rio.rj.gov.br/bairroscariocas/index_bairro.htm. 
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de Alemão and Rocinha, which host nearly 70,000 residents each. Similar to these other 
neighborhoods, Maré hosts more than just residents. These three communities are well known 
for their heavy criminal group presences and often contain territorial claims from multiple 
criminal factions in separate areas of the favela. Maré is unique in its combination of both drug 
trafficking and militia groups, boasting both the Terceiro Comando and ADA trafficking gangs 
and the fifth largest presence of militias in all of Rio de Janeiro.21   
 
The Importance of Maré 
 
 Maré, along with Alemão and Rocinha, became a crucial test of the scale of the UPP and 
its ability to revolutionize even the most difficult areas of the city. Unlike the first 
implementation locations – Santa Marta, for instance – Alemão, Rocinha, and Maré all were of 
“overriding significance” because they posed significant problems to pacification considering the 
presence of multiple criminal groups. Complexo do Alemão was first occupied by the military in 
November 2010 as a political act to showcase the sincerity of the government’s commitment to 
eliminate drug kingpins but was not a part of UPP installation. Alemão was then occupied again 
and the UPP was officially installed in March 2012; however, the special battalion of the 
Military Police, the BOPE, reoccupied Alemão in March 2014 “to secure the perimeter of the 
entire area as the special forces went in search of the drug kingpins.”22 Rocinha was first 
occupied in November 2011 by the military police, and the UPP was officially installed in 
September 2012 according to official UPP timetables.23 Considering both Alemão and Rocinha 
officially installed the UPP, they are both considered to be “pacified” communities; however, the 
UPP has not “pacified” the turmoil nor improved daily life. Alemão and Rocinha display the 
negative results of unprepared, scaled implementations of the UPP: ongoing turmoil, increased 
militarization, and resident exclusion from the pacification process.  
 
The occupation of Maré mirrors the experiences of Alemão and Rocinha. Maré was first 
occupied by the military police on March 30th, 2014.24 According to the same UPP database, 
Maré has not yet officially installed the UPP and is therefore not in the final stages of 
“pacification.” For this reason, all discussion about the pacification process in Maré will focus on 
steps one and two as described in Decreto 42.787: tactics and stabilization. Despite occupation of 
Maré in March 2014, the initial “tactics” phase experienced unexpected resistance. As a result, 
the current governor of Rio de Janeiro, Luiz Fernando Pezão, requested the use of national force 
on July 15th, 2014, and federal army troops were mobilized after Brazil’s Justice Minister, José 
                                                
21 Marco Antônio Martins, “Operação prende 16 pms no rio, entre eles, comandante de batalhao,” Folha de S. Paulo, 
October 9, 2014, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/10/1529828-operacao-prende-16-pms-no-rio-entre-
eles-comandante-de-batalhao.shtml.  
22 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas”; G1 Rio, “Bope ocupa Conjunto de Favelas do Alemão e da Penha, no 
Rio,” G1, March 15, 2014, http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2014/03/bope-ocupa-conjunto-de-favelas-do-
alemao-e-da-penha-no-rio.html; G1 Rio, “Bope inicia ocupação no Alemão para instalação de UPP na comunidade,” 
March 27, 2014, http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2012/03/bope-inicia-ocupacao-no-alemao-para-
instalacao-de-upp-na-comunidade.html; “Histórico, UPP Governo do Rio de Janeiro, 
http://www.upprj.com/index.php/historico.  
23 G1 Rio, “Após décadas à mercê do tráfico, Rocinha é ocupada pela polícia,” G1, November 13, 2011, 
http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2011/11/apos-decadas-merce-do-trafico-rocinha-e-ocupada-pela-
policia.html. 
24 Felicity Clarke, “Maré Vive: Opiniões da Comunidade Sobre a Ocupação Policial,” RioOnWatch, April 10, 2014, 
http://rioonwatch.org.br/?p=11067. 
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Eduardo Cardozo, authorized deployment on August 12th.25 President Dilma Rousseff, then on 
the campaign trail as the president reelect for the October 2014 presidential election, visited 
Maré on September 13th and authorized the extension of the presence of the 2,700 officers 
through December.26 Despite the military occupation, criminal groups have continued to exert 
territorial claims in Maré on various occasions.27 
 
The Maré occupation was not well received by the various communities within Maré. 
Many residents felt disrespected and excluded from the occupation process as a result of police 
actions. These actions included the creation of a legal mandate that justified the invasion of any 
home deemed searchable by the police, the breaking down doors of homes without warning, and 
the murder of ten residents in Maré in July 2014.28 In response to these events, Maré residents led 
protests alongside increasing Internet and social media activity to mobilize popular discontent. 
Residents frequently used the popular hashtags #OqueaMarétem (“what Maré has”), 
#dedentrodaMaré (“inside Maré”), and #Marévive (“Maré lives”) during the occupation period to 
express and organize dissatisfaction with the occupation. Residents’ complaints range from the 
lack of services (“We don’t want just police. We want health, education, homes, and basic 
sanitation”),29 to the increased presence of tourists (“How many hours until the first 
gringos/tourists begin to pass through the streets of Maré?”),30 to residents’ fear (“Scared by the 
police operation that is going on here in the Gaza Strip of Maré. The state brings everything but 
peace!”).31 A female educator with 17 years of experience in Maré further expatiated on a social 
media blog about the “military occupation did not resolve the problems from before. The traffic 
never left. The solution is to create a neighborhood, open and pave the streets, and provide basic 
sanitation for all.”32 Many Maré residents question the warlike occupation of Maré, where 
soldiers with military-grade weaponry roam the streets and tanks sit on street corners. Many 
Maré residents continue to express the difficulties of the occupation period in Maré: 
 
“Who are the war tanks here in Maré for? Our taxes are being used for the 
spectacularization of the State, for the political and commercial propaganda in the media 
and the criminalization of poverty. These forces could be helping to improve the roads in 
the favelas […] instead of standing around and wasting fuel with these tanks. They could 
be brining construction materials to remodel houses, instead of brandishing their rifles 
and these features of psychopaths. They could be creating properly equipped community 
                                                
25 Agência Brasil, “Força Nacional de Segurança vai auxiliar no patrulhamento da Maré, no Rio,” Folha de S.Paulo, 
August 12, 2014, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/08/1499139-ministro-libera-permanencia-da-forca-
nacional-na-mare-no-rio-ate-outubro.shtml.   
26 “Rousseff in Rio slum visit as poll gap closes,” Tengri News, September 13, 2014, 
http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Rousseff-in-Rio-slum-visit-as-poll-gap-closes-256138/.  
27 In late September of 2014, both Amigos dos Amigos and the Terceiro Comando trafficking gangs launched 
attacks to regain territorial control in Maré. Gabriel Sabóai, “Acessos do Complexo da Maré estão sob forte 
vigilância do Exército,” O Dia, September 25, 2014, http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2014-09-25/acessos-
do-complexo-da-mare-estao-sob-forte-vigilancia-do-exercito.html.  
28 Felicity Clarke, “Maré Vive: Opiniões da Comunidade Sobre a Ocupação Policial”; Felicity Clarke, “Never 
Again: Maré Remembers 10 Dead in Police Operation,” RioOnWatch, July 4, 2014, 
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=10000.  
29 Santiago, Raull @raullsanitago post on Twitter, April 1, 2014.  
30 Adriana Diah @adriana_diah, post on Twitter, March 30, 2014.  
31 Thaís Cavalcante @tcavalcantes, post on Twitter, March 12, 2014. 
32 Sabóai, “Acessos do Complexo da Maré estão sob forte vigilância do Exército.” 
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hospitals, with quick and effective service, instead of these command centers to kill. But I 
think this is a tremendous utopia.”33 
 
“For residents, the most cruel thing is that you no longer know or recognize the place 
where you live. You also don’t recognize that identity [of being from that neighborhood]. 
I spent a lot of time in my life creating this identity with this place, but I have to 
understand that this process of pacification is independent from what I know because I no 
longer see anything I saw before. This is cruel. It is also cruel is what the media sells, the 
media’s portrayal that people believe that says there is peace here… there is not peace. 
It’s ridiculous because this peace was never given to me. That peace denied my right to 
security. We believe in this crazy logic that we are developing peace, but what is peace? 
No one wants to speak about war, but everyone who speaks about war with this 
perception speaks about peace. Boys who are 16, 12, or 17 years old already have a very 
contextualized view of war.”34  
 
 Despite opinions of anger and vast criticism, residents in Maré maintain the hope that the 
occupation will “bring basic, public services, the right to come and go as we always have, and 
that the police will act within the laws and be patient with their acceptance into the community.” 
The Maré community itself is taking action to begin to provide themselves with services through 
community participation in lieu of government provisions. For example, a group of Maré youth 
gathered in September 2014 to begin a map-making project for the community to reject human 
rights violations.35 Although these actions are difficult to self-organize, Maré residents show a 
commitment to improving their living conditions. Maré continues to be occupied by the Força 
Nacional de Seguridade Pública and does not show signs of near future implementation of the 
UPP; however, the “pacification” process has already delegitimized the program in the eyes of 
many Maré residents. 
  
 Especially in Maré, the “pacification” process has not changed the rhetoric of war and 
thus does not integrate its residents into Rio society. Despite this reality, Maré residents have 
utilized their opposition to pacification to generate a social discourse around unity and 
discrimination. Through their complaints on social media, their exposure of reality through 
nontraditional forms of media, and the increased reporting of crimes, favela residents demand 
better policing practices. The incorporation of favelas has not been perfect nor has it been part of 
the UPP program, yet residents have carved out their own space to participate in civil society and 
let their voices be heard. Unintentionally, the UPP created the platform for the discontent, and 
subsequently encouraged the public demand for residents’ opinions. For this reason, the UPP 
must continue despites its shortcomings.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Clarke, “Maré Vive: Opiniões da Comunidade Sobre a Ocupação Policial.”  
34 Maré resident and UNIRIO student, 2014. 
35 “Maré ganhará mapa de violações à juventude," Favela 247, September 24, 2014, 
http://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/favela247/154584/Mar%C3%A9-ganhar%C3%A1-mapa-de-
viola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-%C3%A0-juventude.htm.  
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4.4 Comparison 
 
Both the Santa Marta and the Complexo da Maré cases offer noteworthy data for 
evaluating the UPP program. First, their significant differences greatly impact these results, and 
must be utilized to understand in what conditions the UPP supposedly thrives. 
 
Figure 5 
 Santa Marta Complexo da Maré 
Population size 3,900 residents 130,000 residents 
Number of homes 1,176 43,038 
Geographic Location South Zone, Rio de Janeiro North Zone, Rio de Janeiro 
RISP & AISP RISP 1 (AISP 16)36 RISP 1 (AISP 22) 
Importance of location Christ the Redeemer, favela 
itself popular among tourists 
Highway, Linha Vermelha and 
Linha Amarela metro lines 
UPP implementation date 12/18/2008 03/30/2014 
Criminal group presence One drug trafficking faction Multiple factions, including 
both traffickers and militias 
Pacification status Pacified Not pacified 
Community response to 
pacification 
Little resistance Significant resistance 
 
Based on sheer numbers, Santa Marta trumps Complexo da Maré as an ideal environment 
to experiment with a new program. With an estimated 3,900 residents and 1,176 homes, Santa 
Marta has only 3% of Maré’s population and less than 3% of Maré’s homes. In addition to these 
facts, Santa Marta is considered to be one cohesive neighborhood of residents who identify 
specifically with living in Santa Marta. Maré, on the other hand, is already sub-divided into 
fifteen neighborhoods within the larger complex, making overarching reforms difficult to 
implement without altering them to fit each community. Even if the UPP did attempt to isolate 
and then address just one neighborhood in Maré, the smallest neighborhood, Conjunto Bento 
Ribeiro Dantas, has 3,000 residents and is located directly next to Vila do Pinheiro, a 
neighborhood with nearly 16,000 residents.37 The size of each community also impacts the 
presence of criminal groups, as numerous factions control larger communities, like Maré, and 
smaller communities usually have one ruling dono. While only one drug trafficking faction 
controlled Santa Marta, Maré was a war zone between militias and several trafficking groups, 
including Comando Vermelho, Terceiro Comando, and Amigos dos Amigos.38 
 
                                                
36 “Regiões e áreas Integradas de Segurança Pública – RISP e AISP,” Secretaria de Segurança Governo do Rio de 
Janeiro, August 4, 2014, http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/RelacaoAISP.pdf.  
37 “Conjunto Bento Ribeiro Dantas (Fogo Cruzado),” http://wikimapia.org/6440990/pt/Conjunto-Bento-Ribeiro-
Dantas-Fogo-Cruzado. “Conjunto Vila do Pinheiro,” http://wikimapia.org/10097805/pt/Conjunto-Vila-do-Pinheiro.  
38 Adrina Facina (Professor of Anthropology at UFRJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
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Their implementation dates, Santa Marta in December 2008 and Maré in March 2014, 
correlate with their geographic locations and AISPs. Even though they are both located within 
RISP 1, they are patrolled by different police units in their respective AISPs, 16 and 22. These 
AISPs reflect their locations within RISP 1, with Santa Marta in the South Zone of Rio and Maré 
in the North Zone. Santa Marta is closely located to tourist attractions alongside being a tourist 
attraction in itself. While Maré is not geographically proximate to any large tourist attractions, it 
does border the highway from the Galeão Rio de Janeiro International Airport into the South 
Zone of Rio and is close to the Linha Vermelha and Linha Amarela metro lines.39 Both favelas, 
then, interact with tourists. Based on their geographic locations alone, Santa Marta and Maré 
pose drastically different security concerns to tourists and therefore were prioritized in 
accordance with that direct potential threat level.  
 
Lastly, their implementation processes showcase the variation in acceptance of the UPP 
and the difficulty in scaling the operation. Santa Marta experienced a rather easy occupation and 
UPP implementation overall, leading to its model “pacification.” Considering it was the pilot 
program, Santa Marta residents did not actively resist the program. Maré, however, is still not 
“pacified” and has no UPP presence. With the continued delay of “pacification” alongside 
continuing unrest and violence, residents are increasingly resisting the occupation and losing 
faith in the pacification efforts. This resistance may occur in protests, but the vast majority of the 
discontent took to the Internet in an effort to spread awareness beyond Maré’s borders and 
connect with other favelas experiencing the same difficulties.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The implementation locations of the UPP specifically indicate the target of the UPP: the 
South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, where a majority of tourists and mega events would and will be 
taking place. The specific case studies of the pacification experiences of Santa Marta and 
Complexo da Maré reveal the varied experiences of the UPP dependent on each community. The 
comparison of the two favelas showcases the difficulty in scaling the project from Santa Marta, a 
small favela with limited variables, to Complexo da Maré, the largest favela in Rio with 
numerous uncontrollable factors influencing the success of the UPP program.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Raquel Willadino (Director of Observatório de Favelas), in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
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Chapter 5 
The Implications and Consequences Part 1: The UPP and Violence Rates 
 
 Given the structure of the UPP within the Military Police, there are two defined possible 
measures of the success of territorial control by the government. The first is the primary focus of 
the UPP in the government decrees: to reestablish order, and therefore decrease violence through 
measurement of violent crime rates. The second, discussed in Chapter 6, concerns the availability 
of services. 
 
5.1 The Effect of the UPP on Violence Rates 
 
 The UPP first measured its success in terms of the impact of territorial control on 
violence rates in “pacified” communities. This measure was used because a large part of the 
UPP, as described by one officer, was to “establish peace” in favelas.1  This peace is then 
directly associated with the elimination of criminal groups in these communities. Yet, there is no 
authoritative source for accurate violence rates recorded in “pacified” communities. Estimates 
vary, and therefore contradicting evidence muddles any analysis of whether the UPP does 
definitively lower violence rates.  
 
Initially, violence rates decreased in the first communities. This positive news was based 
largely on the Santa Marta pilot, which boasted a zero-homicide rate. Beyond the pilot, data 
collected in 2013 by the Public Safety Institute of the State of Rio de Janeiro stated the 
“homicide rates in the first 29 favelas to receive UPPs is 8.7 per 100,000 residents.”2 Data 
reported by the non-government organization, the Brazilian Forum for Public Security, 
corroborated this evidence, stating the homicide rate dropped by 80% in favelas with UPP 
presence.3 Further evidence provided by the Folha de São Paulo also supported the claim, stating 
that from 2012 to 2013 there had been a respective drop in lethal crime from 68 victims to 50 
victims in UPP areas.4 The homicide rate also experienced significant drops (see Figure 6): the 
homicide rate nearly halved between 2005 and 2014, policing killings decreased by over 60% 
from 2007 to 2012, and homicides decreased overall by over 50% throughout Rio.5 Based on 
these improvements, “specialists estimate that around 5,000 murders were prevented since the 
                                                
1 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 141. 
2 Janet Tappin Coelho, “Brazil's "peace police" turn five. Are Rio's favelas safer?”, CSMonitor, December 19, 2013, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/1219/Brazil-s-peace-police-turn-five.-Are-Rio-s-favela-s-safer.  
3 Misha Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas,” Financial Times, November 2, 2012,  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/27511af8-23b3-11e2-a46b00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wY22WrzX. 
4 “Cresce o número de assaltos nas comunidades do Rio com UPPs,” Folha de S.Paulo, May 19, 2014, 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/05/1456880-governo-do-rio-registra-aumento-no-numero-de-assaltos-
nas-comunidades-com-upps.shtml.  
5 Eduarda de La Rocque and Petras Shelton-Zumpano, “The Sustainable Development Strategy of the Municipal 
Government of Rio de Janeiro” (paper presented at the “Citizen Security in Brazil: Progress and Challenges” at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., March 28, 2014), 5, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Paper_%20La%20Rocque%20and%20Shelton-
Zumpano_2014_0.pdf; Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 4: Pacifying Police Units,” 
RioOnWatch, May 1, 2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14728. 
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inauguration of the pacifying police units,” and the UPPs were credited for saving an “estimated 
60 lives a year per 100,000 inhabitants.”6  
 
Figure 6 
Factor Homicide Rate Policing Killings  
in the State 
Homicide Rate  
throughout Rio 
 2005 2014 2007 2012 2007 2012 
42 per 
100,000 
residents 
24 per 
100,000 
residents 
1,330 
killings 
504 
killings 
2,336 
homicides 
1,026 
homicides 
% Difference 43% decrease 62% decrease 56% decrease 
         
 Despite these significant improvements in lethal violent crimes, violence continues 
within and outside of favelas. Within the city, violence rates increased in 2013 and 2014, 
including homicide rates alongside other forms of reported violent crime, including theft, rape, 
and domestic violence (see Figures 7 and 8). After initial drops in homicide rates in the city of 
Rio, the homicide rate increased by 10% in 2013.7 In the first six months of 2014, the homicide 
rate had already increased by 11%, with “3,463 murders registered between January and August 
2014.”8 Compared to 2013, “homicides, car theft, and robbery have increased across Rio state 
during the first eight months of 2014, compared to the same period last year.” The number of 
street robberies increased by 7% from 2012 to 2013 and then again by 41% from 2013 to the first 
months of 2014, while car thefts specifically increased by 31%.9  Based on this evidence, the 
UPP did seem somewhat responsible for the initial decrease in violent crime rates from 2010 to 
2012; however, the recent rise in rates solidifies the UPP has not entirely fulfilled a complete and 
stable reduction in violent crime through territorial control.  
 
Figure 7 
Factor Homicide Rate Street Robberies 
 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
3,148 homicides 3,463 homicides 7% increase -- 
% Difference 10% increase -- 41% increase 
 
This spike in violence is most likely attributable to the relocation of violence from UPP-
occupied favelas to surrounding favelas and areas of Rio de Janeiro. Even before the UPP, 
however, one resident expressed the overflow of crime from the favela to the asphalt as “gangs 
[were] dealing drugs to the rich kids…but they were starting to get into the kidnap game as 
well.”10 This spillover and relocation of violence before and after the UPP “strengthen the idea of 
                                                
6 Julia Michaels, “New Rio de Janeiro Police Force Reduces Favela Violence,” InSight Crime, August 8, 2012, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/new-rio-de-janeiro-police-force-reduces-favela-violence-study.  
7 La Rocque and Shelton-Zumpano, “The Sustainable Development Strategy of the Municipal Government of Rio de 
Janeiro.” 
8 Elyssa Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil's Rio de Janeiro State?”, Insight Crime, September 24, 2014, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/why-is-crime-rising-in-rio-de-janeiro-state. 
9 Cresce o número de assaltos nas comunidades do Rio com UPPs”; Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil's 
Rio de Janeiro State?” 
10 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.” 
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fragmentation of the social fabric and spatial segregation.”11 Once the UPP began, it did not and 
does not eliminate the criminal groups; however, it forces them out of their original communities 
and into other areas of the city. A favela resident attributed this rise in violence to the fact that 
when traficantes specifically go to another favela, “they aren’t from the same faction as the other 
criminal groups there, and they don’t know the people there,” so they are more likely to be 
violent.12 The displacement of the groups then results in the displacement of the crime, leading 
groups to “re-territorialize other locations.” Perhaps this strategy is intentional, as “the state 
would prefer to face criminals (and the bloody consequences) in more peripheral parts of the 
city.”13 Despite this possibility, the relocation of crime has caused the “metropolitization of 
crime.” For example, violence in Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan region – known as Rio’s interior 
– increased in the first eight months of 2014, an “approximate 19 percent increase from the same 
period in 2013.”14  As a result of either crime relocation or a lack of police presence, violence 
also increased in the areas of Baixada, the North Zone, and the West Zone. Increased crime also 
appeared in Niterói, a municipality of the state of Rio, and residents protested to improve 
security in the region.15 
 
Although the UPP showed promising signs of limiting violent crime, not all forms of 
violent crime declined. As displayed in Figure 8, the Laboratório de Análise da Violência 
(Laboratory for Violence Analysis or LAV) at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
(LAV at Rio de Janeiro State University or UERJ) found the number of victims of 
disappearances (desaparecimentos), intentional injuries (lesões dolosas), domestic and familial 
violence (violência doméstica e familiar), threats (ameaças) and rape (estrupo) increased, 
alongside the increase in occurrences of thefts (furtos) and drug-related crimes (crimes relativos 
a drogas). A necessary explanation of increased crime could very well be a positive indicator of 
the success of the UPP: more residents may now be reporting incidents of violent crime, when in 
the past they may not have. Increased reporting of crime often signals an increased trust in the 
rule of law and judiciary system, ultimately translating as a heightened confidence of residents 
because of the UPP’s presence or in the UPP itself. The increased rates of reported violent 
crimes could also mean more disappearances, rapes, etc. are actually occurring within the 
communities. Some believe the latter, attributing this increase in violent crime to the replacement 
of the previous dono of the favela, who “kept a degree of order within the community” through 
extrajudicial violence.16 For example, “if a girl was the victim of rape, she could appeal to the 
gang bosses for justice and if the perpetrator were found, he would be executed.” As the UPP 
does not pose the same threat of punitive, extrajudicial action on favela residents, perhaps violent 
crime has increased.  
 
                                                
11 Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade do Rio de 
Janeiro,” 4, 12, and 16. 
12 Cajú resident and UNIRIO student, in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
13 Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 4: Pacifying Police Units.” 
14 Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil's Rio de Janeiro State?” 
15 Leandra Lima, “Moradores de São Francisco, em Niterói, fazem manifestação por melhoria de segurança,” O 
Globo, March 11, 2014, http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/moradores-de-sao-francisco-em-niteroi-fazem-manifestacao-
por-melhoria-de-seguranca-4282594.  
16 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.” 
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Figure 8: The “Numero médio de casos por mês e comunidade” column compares the average 
number of each occurrence before “Pré UPP” and after “Pós UPP” the UPP was implemented. 
The right hand column, “Taxa media por mês e comunidade (por 100,000 hab.)” then compares 
the average rate of the occurrences per month per 100,000 residents. Source: Cano, Os Donos 
do Morro, 32. 
 
 I contend that violence rates have increased for one of two reasons. First, I agree that 
residents most likely feel more comfortable reporting crimes, and therefore the number of violent 
crimes reported has increased. The second concerns the target of the UPP. As I previously 
discussed, the UPP primarily targets drug trafficking groups, demonstrated through both its 
rhetoric and its implementation locations. The number of violent crimes is also increasing, 
notably those such as threats, robbery, rape, and domestic violence, because the UPP largely 
ignores the presence of militias. While the UPP may target drug trafficking and only successfully 
eliminates how well armed traficantes are, it does not attack the militias, the more violent group 
of the two. Militias pose a greater threat to public security and the development of favelas as they 
not only cause violence, but they intertwine their extrajudicial activities with the Brazilian 
political system. 
 
5.2 Criminal Groups Revisited 
 
While both drug trafficking gangs and militias may exploit favela communities for their 
own benefits and profit, their level of organization varies and ultimately influences their potential 
threat level and the impact they have on favela residents. To discuss this level of organization, I 
will use two terms established by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): 
criminal enterprise, and organized crime.17 Criminal enterprise is described as “a group of 
individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal 
activity,” including any legal or illegal entity. Organized crime, on the other hand, is “any group 
                                                
17 “Organized Crime: Glossary of Terms,” Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/organizedcrime/glossary.  
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having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money 
through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or 
threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant 
impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole.” Although both 
traficantes and milícias can be labeled as organized crime based on the FBI definition, it is 
necessary to differentiate their organizations beyond a rating of “low level” or “high level” of 
organized criminal activity. Based on this logic, I argue the most common form of drug 
trafficking gang more accurately falls under the “criminal enterprise” category, while militias 
more fully embody the elements of organized crime. 
 
Figure 9 
 Traficantes Milícias 
Organization level Criminal enterprise Organized crime 
Member profile Youth (10 years old - early 20’s) Professionals, former police officers, 
firefighters, and politicians 
Member origins Within the favela Outside the favela 
Purpose of group Drug trafficking Extortion 
Primary region  South Zone (Zona Sul, RISP 1) West Zone (Zona Oeste, RISP 2) 
Control over 
favelas (2013 data) 
37% of Rio favelas  45% of Rio favelas 
Violence rates 
(2011 data) 
Traficantes, police, and all other 
compose remaining 55%  
45% of the murders that occurred in 
Rio  
Police relations Bribery and drug transactions Close ties that allows collaboration 
and political ties, resulting in less 
investigations 
Recognized groups Comando Vermelho, Terceiro 
Comando, Amigos dos Amigos 
Liga de Justiça 
Number of UPPs in 
previously occupied 
territories 
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1 
 
Criminal Group A: Traficantes 
 
Beyond their size and scale, drug trafficking groups are less organized than militias. Part 
of the reason is the average age of members. Drug gangs primarily consist of young, male favela 
residents considered to fall in the following age groups: childhood development (10-12 years 
old), adolescents (13-19 years old), and the early years of young adulthood (18-35 years old).18 
The population of young adults involved in drug trafficking primarily consists of the earlier years 
of young adulthood because of the short lifespan of traficantes that does not often surpass the 
early 20s.19 Although members of drug gangs often get involved earlier than members of militias, 
young and literally short-lived members simply do not produce consistent hierarchy to generate 
                                                
18 “What is a Young Adult?” Nazarene.org, http://nazarene.org/files/docs/young%20adult-2.pdf.  
19 Brett Forrest, “Party Down, Favela Style,” The New York Times, August 28, 2012, 
 http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/brazilian-drug-traffickers-try-controlling-the-slums-with-
parties/?_r=0.  
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substantial organization. Many of these gangs rely temporarily on their current local boss for 
direction, and once one boss is killed, either his murderer steps into his role or lower ranking 
officials within the gang battle for the spot. This type of hierarchy is neither consistent nor 
systematic, leaving much variation between bosses and ultimately little time to create a 
sustainable and unbreakable hereditary system. Hereditary system does exist, however, within 
local networks based on family relations, further explaining the fragmented structure between 
favelas and the lack of cohesive action or strategy.20 Janice Perlman further confirms that “the 
traffic is not a ‘parallel power’…it is not a substate or a substitute for the state. There is a 
vacuum where the state should be, and the traffic has stepped into that vacuum unopposed by 
any governmental authority and accountable to no one except itself.”21 
 
Despite their lower level of organization and my classification as a “criminal enterprise,” 
traficantes still significantly and negatively impact favela communities. Drug trafficking groups 
still conduct substantial illegal activity that results in extrajudicial violence, territorial disputes, 
extortion, bribery, and blackmail. These assertions of power originate in how traficantes became 
the donos do morro (bosses of the favela/hill). In the transitional phase from the Brazilian 
military dictatorship to their current electoral democracy in the early 1980s, violent crime surged 
as criminal groups seizing and controlling marginalized areas of Rio. Drug trafficking gangs 
primarily exist to generate income through the sale of drugs to fulfill the international demand 
for illegal drugs. Without government presence or suppression, drug gangs became militarized to 
defend their respective territories from the state and each other. Territorial claims were further 
exacerbated with the help of the police, who helped establish bocas, or publicly known, fixed 
drug-selling spots, that would not be targeted by police in exchange for bribes.22 Once territorial 
claims were established and in need of protection, one could “only gain access to the settlements 
by armed force or in consultation with the drug lords; [and] even social projects and public 
infrastructural measures could only be implemented through negotiations with the respective 
gangs.”23  
 
Drug traffickers are by far and away the most recognized group for their violence by 
Brazilians and non-Brazilians. The most infamous portrayal of their ruthlessness is the 2002 
film, City of God (Cidade de Deus), which follows the story of a young, black, male favela 
resident named Buscapé, or Rocket, as he finds himself in the middle of an ongoing war between 
several groups in the Cidade de Deus favela. Throughout the film, sensationalized portrayals of 
opposing groups of traficantes who torture and murder each other for territory, and the 
concluding scene establishes the cycle of violence by showcasing a young group of boys 
preparing to take over the previous groups’ trade networks. This film, along with other films that 
showcase favelas primarily as the residence of criminals (Tropa da Elite, for example), 
                                                
20 Ignácio Cano and Thais Duarte, No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro (Fundação Heinrich 
Böll: 2012), 147. 
21 Janice Perlman, Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge of Rio de Janeiro (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
22 Luiz Eduardo Soares, “Além do bem e do mal na cidade sitiada,” Caderno Aliás, Jornal Estado de SP, November 
11, 2011, http://luizeduardosoares.blogspot.com/2011/11/alem-do-bem-e-do-mal-na-cidade-sitiada.html.  
23 Malte Steinbrink, “Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging - the example of Rio de 
Janeiro,” Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 144, no. 2 (November 2013), 
http://www.academia.edu/3990824/Festifavelisation_mega-events_slums_and_strategic_city-
staging_the_example_of_Rio_de_Janeiro. 
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contributed to the international perception of insecurity within Brazil and specifically Rio de 
Janeiro.  
 
Although traficantes pose a significant security threat as the proxy for the state in over 
one third of Rio’s favelas, the Rio state government has done little to change this reality. A large 
reason for this lies in the corruption within Rio’s police forces and politicians, who often 
establish links with drug lords and then require payouts of “up to 50 percent of the drug lords' 
profits [that then go] to the police and officers of the criminal justice system.”24 Traficantes have 
also managed to gain significant control over their communities through their intermediary 
relationship with Residents’ Associations and building a form of trusting relationship with 
residents. The drug traffickers often build connections with Residents’ Associations through their 
shared status of convivente, or cohabitant, implying the intermediate relationship that results 
from their common presence in and origin from the favela. The Residents’ Associations, in these 
relationships, do not support the extrajudicial functions of the traffickers, but attempt to mediate 
their control. This relationship often results from a unique system of trust that can exist between 
residents and the local traficantes, one that is based in the security functions drug traffickers 
offer. These security practices primarily include extrajudicial violence that serve as reactionary 
consequences to the presence of other crime within the favela, including rapes, domestic abuse, 
and robberies.  
 
Although this security comes at the expense of extrajudicial and sometimes unpredictable 
violence, it still guarantees some forms of security residents find valuable, despite the reality of 
daily shootouts and violence perpetuated by the state.25 In some instances, residents portray 
traficantes as Robin Hood archetypes who are “victims of injustice” driven by the state, who take 
from Rio’s rich and use drug money to give to their own poor,26 who maintain the “just revenge” 
or “self defense” moderation of violence,27 and who are “indistinguishable from the common 
man.”28 This portrayal defends traficantes and criticizes the state, reflecting frustration with the 
lack of government action rather than showcasing unyielding support for criminal groups. This 
archetype also hails from the reality that most traficantes originate from the favelas where they 
operate. As one student, who lives in the favela of Cajú, explained, “Before the UPP, the 
majority of traficantes were whatever guy you grew up with and played in the street with. It was 
your friend who became a traficante, so then he knew your mom and he respected older people 
and your friends – not that I’m defending traficantes – but you had this relationship with them.”29 
                                                
24 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.” 
25 Graciano Lourenço Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na 
Cidade do Rio de Janeiro,” (Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, 2012). 
26 In Cidade dos Homens, younger children praise one of the well-known traficantes as he walks through the streets 
of the favela and hands out money. These children chant, “Gives us money because he can, Espeto’s the man!”, 
ultimately epitomizing the Robin Hood archetype of taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Cidade dos 
Homens, DVD, October 2002-December 2005. 
27 In each regard, traficantes conduct “just revenge” violence to punish wrongdoers within the favela who commit 
rape, robberies, etc., and use “self defense” violence when dealing with the unjust police forces and state system. A 
scene in Cidade dos Homens further justifies these forms of violence, when one boy defends his consideration to 
join a drug trafficking gang: “You don’t see the good side of it here in the favela. There aren’t any rapes, robberies, 
or fights.”  
28 As favela residents, traffickers are members of the favela often before they join the gang present in their favela. 
Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits, (The New Press, 2000). 
29 Cajú resident and UNIRIO student, in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
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Although the UPP has focused on drug traffickers rather than militias, the trafficking of 
drugs still exists. The UPP has, however, reduced the number of arms possessed by each group 
and the volume of trafficking and sales.30  
 
Criminal Group B: Milícias 
 
Militias maintain strong police ties as a negotiation tool to protect their own operations. 
First, police view militias as the lesser of two evils in comparison to the drug traffic and allow 
their continuation considering many militia members are also police officers. Militias also 
actively avoid shootouts with the police, unlike traficantes, generating a mutual acceptance of 
each other and an argument that favelas with militias are safer than those with traficantes.31 
Militias are also state-like in their operations because of their access to privileged information 
about police action, and they often conduct their activities with knowledge of police 
preferences.32 Lastly, police do not thoroughly investigate militias. The investigators, usually 
police intelligence units, are usually involved in the militias themselves and, therefore, give the 
government smaller lists of suspects, handing over “only 40 or 50” names when the list “should 
have 700 names on it.”33 These ties increasingly discouraged and continue to deter thorough 
investigation of militias, their actions, and their negative influence. 
 
Militias are also primarily located in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, where 
communities are further displaced from downtown Rio and more difficult to patrol by police 
officers. The West Zone is, unsurprisingly, the most violent region of Rio de Janeiro state but 
receives less attention than the South Zone in the media.34 Although little information about 
large-scale militia operations is available, militia operations can resemble drug trafficking in that 
they operate within individual communities. However, there are multi-community militias, the 
largest of which calls itself the Liga de Justiça, or “Justice League,” and uses the Batman symbol 
as its logo.35 Based on their stronger system of hierarchy and their increased professionalism, 
militias are undoubtedly more organized with stronger hereditary systems of power. This degree 
of organization more accurately fulfills the definition of an organized criminal group, rather than 
a lower level criminal enterprise. 
 
Militia operations have several facets. First, militias focus the majority of their operations 
on resource and service extortion for profit within the favelas. These resources and services 
                                                
30 “Is Rio's Tough Love Strategy Against Violence Working?” Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars Brazil Institute (January 2012), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Is%20Rio%27s%20Tough%20Love%20Strategy%20Against%20Vi
olence%20Working,%20Final.pdf.   
31 Ignácio Cano and Eduardo Ribeiro, “Venciendo una guerra que nunca existió: La experiencia de las UPP en Río 
de Janeiro” (2011), 3. 
32 Marco Antônio Martins, “Operação prende 16 pms no rio, entre eles, comandante de batalhao,” Folha de S. Paulo, 
October 9, 2014, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2014/10/1529828-operacao-prende-16-pms-no-rio-entre-
eles-comandante-de-batalhao.shtml. 
33 Monte Reel, “In Rio's Slums, Militias Fuel Violence They Seek to Quell,” The Washington Post, March 28, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702337.html. 
34 Graciano Lourenço Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na 
Cidade do Rio de Janeiro,” (Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, 2012). 
35 Martins, “Operação prende 16 pms no rio, entre eles, comandante de batalhao.”  
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include gas, cable, water, internet, and alternative transportation (i.e. motor taxis, vans).36 
Militias utilize their political connections to impact elections and often influence the currais 
eleitorais, or electoral votes, by coercing favela residents to vote for candidates nominated by the 
militias. In many cases, militia bosses themselves are often the candidates for these political 
positions of the state legislature, and studies show correlation between militia domination and the 
electoral candidates who dominate certain regions. For this reason, various Brazilian politicians 
have recently denounced militias, calling them a “tumor” and the “new social cancer.”37 Their 
interconnected relationship with politics showcases their high levels of organization and their 
impact on the favelas beyond their physical presence, supporting their label as groups more 
closely embodying the organized crime definition. To maintain a monopoly on violence within 
their territories, militias also charge fees for local, “private security” for favela residents, which 
includes carrying out extrajudicial killings.38 Militias commit high levels of violence because 
militia members are often compromised of people who do not live in the favelas themselves and 
are often from communities and higher-class condominiums.39 Militias are external forces, and 
they “are more violent on the communities… unlike drug dealers who live among the 
residents.”40  
 
 The history of militias proves them to be much more recent entities than the traficantes. 
In 2004, militias controlled only six favelas in Rio. Ten years later, over 145 militias control over 
28 neighborhoods.41 A separate 2013 report conducted by scholars at the State University of Rio 
(UERJ) stated militias control 45% of Rio’s favelas, or about 90 favelas.42 The earliest version of 
the militias arose during the 1964-85 military dictatorship, when death squads such as the 
Homens de Ouro (“Golden Men”) were principally “police officers who carried out private 
justice for local businesspeople, principally in the favelas.”43 Many residents and NGOs associate 
this label of “death squads” or grupos de extermínio, with militias.44 The label continues because 
of the intensification of militia actions in recent years, which often resembles these early death 
squads in how they demonstrate the “new relationship between security forces and crime 
[consisting of the] direct participation in the criminal exploitation of communities, instead of 
merely passive operation, for example, by means of corruption.”45  
 
                                                
36 For example, in the Nova Iguaçu favela in Baixada Fluminense, militias charge a R$ 10 fee per home for water. 
Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 17; Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos 
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39 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 79. 
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42 Jay Forte, “Militia Gangs Control Nearly Half of Rio Favelas,” The Rio Times, December 10, 2013, 
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43 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 2: From Dictatorship to Drug War,” 
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 Militias were not recognized as criminal groups that posed a significant threat to state 
power until May 2008. Before 2008, the Rio de Janeiro state governor, Sérgio Cabral Filho, 
openly supported the militias alongside Rio de Janerio mayor, Eduardo Paes.46 In preparation for 
the 2007 Pan American Games, another multi-sport event held in Rio de Janeiro in July, the 
media further exalted the militias as defenders of the poor against the problems created by the 
drug trade, and militias were able to publicly expand throughout Rio as a form of additional 
security force for the games.47 In May 2008, militias tortured a group of journalists from the 
Brazilian newspaper “O Dia” in the Batan favela in Rio’s West Zone. Following their torture, 
Rio’s Legislative Assembly approved a Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry or CPI) in June 2008 to investigate militias and their actions.48 The CPI 
then released an extensive report, identifying potential militia members and recommendations for 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office.49 Following Batan and the CPI’s findings, Sérgio Cabral and the 
Secretary of Security both publicly denounced militias as organized criminal groups.50 Cabral 
then urged his colleagues to “reject the notion that the militias are the lesser of two evils” and 
“compared the recent rise of the militias to the situation in Colombia, where the involvement of 
paramilitary fighters has further muddied the country's long-running battle against Marxist 
guerrillas.”51 The negative discourse surrounding militias was further compounded by a report 
released by Rio’s Subsecretaria de Inteligência (Sub secretary of Intelligence), who proved that 
of the 171 communities with militias, 119 (almost 70%) had not previously belonged to any 
criminal group. This information thus debunked the myth of the militia as a crusade against 
trafficking, because it affirmed that militias were present in communities previously unoccupied 
by drug traffickers and were therefore conducting their own operations not as protectorates of the 
poor, but as their exploiters.52 Following this revelation, the 2010 film Tropa da Elite 2: O 
Inimigo Agora é Outro (The Elite Squad 2: The Enemy Within) contained negative portrayals of 
militias present in various favelas. Then, in 2011, speculations regarding the militias’ role in 
murdering Niteroi judge, Judge Patrícia Acioli, forced a local politician and State Deputy, 
Marcelo Freixo, to flee Brazil in “fear of retaliation for his campaign to fight these organized 
crime groups,” after he received death threats supposedly from militias.53	  	  
 
 The violence of militias exceeds that of drug trafficking groups. Much like traficantes, 
militias are also responsible for much of the rampant extrajudicial violence. A 2011 report 
released by the Rio de Janeiro Homicide Division cited militias as “responsible for almost half of 
the homicides in Rio,” or 45% of the murders that occurred in 2011. The remaining 55% of 
homicides, then, encompass the more systematic homicides committed by drug traffickers and 
the police, and also random homicide cases. These homicides committed by militias include both 
disputes over territory with other groups, including other militias and traficantes, and also 
                                                
46 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 61. Rodrigo Badaró, “Lula, Sérgio Cabral e ‘Leandro,’” YouTube, August 7, 2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlKT5CEgnqs.  
47 Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade do Rio de 
Janeiro.” 
48 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 15. 
49 Justiça Global, “Institutional Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro.” 
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extrajudicial killings.54 In terms of disappearances, it is not possible to conclude whether 
disappearances are a practice more closely associated with militias or traficantes, but there are no 
doubts that both of these groups commit this type of crime. While traficantes, for the most part, 
do not allow domestic abuse and see it as a violation of their social order, residents report that 
militias will allow domestic abuse against women because men are allowed to do most anything, 
and the Maria da Penha law does not exist in areas of militia.  
  
 The public opinion about militias reveals that many residents prefer traffickers to militias. 
Beyond simple interview responses stating which they prefer, residents further describe their 
impressions of the linkage between militias and the police. Several beliefs circulate regarding 
militias and their state involvement. Some believe militias do not often battle for territory with 
traficantes because militias “come with the force, with the ‘support’ of the police, with strength 
of the police apparatus.” Other residents have seen police and militia members drinking together 
at parties in the favela, and use this reasoning as evidence of their ties. The last piece of evidence 
lies in the uncertainty of the current standing of militias. While militia members used to be more 
openly disclosed in 2006 and 2007, now residents are unsure if militiamen are ex-police, current 
police, or civilians. This uncertainty generates the feeling that militias are “phantasmal” in a 
way, due to their undetermined positions and capacities for intimidation, and many residents 
speak with doubt, multiple contradictions, ambiguities, and omissions that “revealed terror” 
when discussing militias.  
  
 Currently, several reports reveal the growing links developing between Rio’s militias and 
drug gangs. The Rio crime investigative bureau “has documented several cases involving militias 
that have agreed to allow drug traffickers to operate in militia territory, in exchange for a fee. 
Militias have also recruited gang members to work with them.”55 Authorities first observed 
potential collaboration between the two groups in 2010, when police “recorded phone 
conversations of militia members discussing weapon sales with gangs in Alemão” right before 
the occupation of Alemão by military forces. This potential collaboration worries several 
organizations dedicated to favela residents and the preservation of their rights, as many assert 
this expansion of political influence and networks could strengthen both groups against state 
authorities.56 Another reality of this collaboration is the expansion of the drug trade, as militias 
become increasingly interested in profiting from marijuana and cocaine sales than from 
“neighborhood extortion schemes.”57 If they remain fractured and competitive as they are now, 
traficantes and militias will be easier to divide and conquer; however, if they unite, they hold the 
potential to wield significant and more stable power in and across favelas. Despite this 
possibility, the Rio de Janeiro state government largely ignores the militias in favor of focusing 
on traficantes, and ultimately does not directly target militias. 
 
5.3 Police violence  
 
 While the UPP has reduced violence rates overall, the largest impact of the UPP on 
violence rates has been within the police forces themselves. Before the arrival of the UPP, the 
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auto de resistência was a characteristic label on many police reports of deaths caused by police 
officers. Auto de resistência implied the deceased had somehow resisted police custody or 
authority that then led to their “accidental” or unintended death at the hands of the police. As the 
officers themselves register them, auto de resistência deaths are not heavily investigated; 
however, when auto de resistência deaths are investigated, autopsies of the corpses “reveals 
strong indications of execution,” implying many autos de resistência are not “resistance” deaths 
at all, but rather execution-style murders by police officers. In 2011 alone, “42% of registered 
deaths were labeled auto de resistência in the states of Rio and São Paulo… the majority of 
which were against blacks.”58   
 
This grave picture pre-UPP opened opportunity space for the revamping of the police 
forces. Initially, many hopefuls believed the UPP may work toward this restructuring of the 
police forces that would de-emphasize militarization in favor of community policing practices. 
Ignácio Cano also initially believed the UPP had the capacity to change the police as a whole 
when interviewed in August 2011 by RioRadar: 
 
“The bet on the table – and it is just a bet – is whether we can use the UPPs to reduce 
violence in these 18, or 20, or 50 communities, and if we can use the UPPs to change, on 
the one hand, the way police conduct themselves: police doctrine, police training… Up 
till now, the highest reference of policing is the special units battalion, which killed 
hundreds of people over the last few years. And this is considered to be elite police, so 
we have to change that and we have to show them that elite police are those that get 
themselves into dangerous circumstances without producing any causalities both for 
themselves and for the public. This is a big challenge because it’s not just the police, 
many people in Rio de Janeiro – politicians, journalists, and normal citizens – still think 
policing is getting a machine gun, going to a place where there are criminals, and 
shooting and winning a so called ‘war.’”59 
 
During my interview with Ignácio Cano, nearly three years later in May 2014, Cano 
expressed disappointment in the actual achievement of the UPP in changing the police force as a 
whole: 
 
“It is all part of the bigger picture and the bigger problem that the UPPs have not 
managed to inspire the overall model of public security. There is still an exception... what 
would be expected is, they should inspire the whole policing strategy in Rio. Also, the 
intervention of the BOPE was also important because we hoped to transform the BOPE 
along the way… For example, we interviewed BOPE officers and BOPE command and 
they said, ‘Some of our officers say, “sergeant, we don't like being here, what're we doing 
here, sitting.’ So transforming this very deadly unit was also one of the main targets... the 
UPP was a huge opportunity to transform the police. This was probably its most 
                                                
58 Mauro Donato, “O que são os “autos de resistência” da PM e por que eles têm de acabar,” DCM, April 4, 2014, 
http://www.diariodocentrodomundo.com.br/o-que-sao-os-autos-de-resistencia-da-pm-e-por-que-eles-tem-de-acabar/.  
59 Ignácio Cano (Director of the LAV at UERJ), in discussion with Rio Radar, August 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdhE. 
48 
 
important trait, and it’s also the biggest of our frustrations that we have not made any 
progress in that.”60  
 
Despite Cano’s frustrations that the UPP have yet to revolutionize police practices and 
deflect attitudes surrounding the undeclared war, some police actions have noticeably changed. 
From the beginning to the current stage of the UPP (as shown on Figure 10 below), victims of 
auto de resistência decreased from almost 6 victims per 100,000 residents to less than 1. In 
addition, a LAV report stated the number of deaths during “police interventions…passed from .5 
per month to almost zero.”61 Despite the evidence of progress toward bettering the police forces, 
a study conducted by the Public Security Institute (ISP) found the number of homicides in police 
action increased more than 60% from June 2013 to August 2014, from 144 deaths to 89 
victims.62 Within auto de resistências specifically, police labeled two deaths during police action 
in the Morro de Foguteiro “autos de resistência”; however, further investigation revealed the 
reported accidental deaths were execution-style killings. 
 
  
Figure 10: The number of auto de resistência deaths decreased dramatically following the 
implementation of the UPP in both UPP and police units in the rest of Rio (“resto da cidade”). 
The left bar compares communities with the UPP, while the right bar represents the general (and 
lower) numbers throughout the rest of the city. Source: LAV 
 
Other incidents of violence delegitimize the UPP program. The first and largest scandal 
involving the UPP is known in Rio by one name: Amarildo. Amarildo Dias De Souza was a 
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father of six, a bricklayer, and a resident in the favela of Rocinha. In July 2013, he disappeared. 
Following his prolonged disappearance, his family successfully pursued a public outcry against 
his disappearance, leading to mass demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro and on social media with the 
slogan, “Onde está o Amarildo?” or “Where is Amarildo?” Following this attention, 
investigators took over the case and later revealed UPP officers had detained Amarildo in the 
midst of a drug trafficking investigation. They then announced that Amarildo, an epileptic, died 
while being tortured at the UPP base in Rocinha.63 Ten members of the UPP, including the then-
UPP commander of Rocinha, were originally charged with torturing, murdering, and then hiding 
the body. In total, 15 officers were imprisoned for the torture and death of Amarildo, including 
the UPP commander and sub-commander of Rocinha at the time of Amarildo’s disappearance.64 
The Amarildo case jeopardized the legitimacy of the program and continues to negatively impact 
the UPP’s reputation as a reoccurring criticism. 
 
In 2014 alone, several events continued to taint the reputation of the UPP in Rio society. 
In April 2014, police violence in the Pavão-Pavãozinho favela resulted in the death of a well-
known resident, Douglas da Silva. DG, as he was called, was a dancer on the TV program 
Esquenta on TV Globo. The death of the dançarino (dancer) in this favela closest to the richer, 
more touristy regions of Rio then sparked protests amongst the residents, resulting in the event 
described at the very beginning of this work.65  In late June 2014, police were involved in the 
killing of ten residents in Maré, and further protests ensued.66  In late September 2014, police 
shot another innocent in Complexo de Alemão, sparking more protests.67 In addition to these 
killings by police officers, several officers have also died while serving on their respective UPP 
forces. Again in Complexo de Alemão, Cano commented, “five policemen have been killed” in 
2014 alone.”68 National Public Radio also broadcasted statistics that “At least 87 policemen were 
killed in 2014 in Rio state alone…[and] other groups such as police unions say the number is at 
least triple that.”69 Each violent interaction continues to reduce the credibility of the program as 
an innovative and trustworthy strategy, in turn aggravating the already-vicious cycle of distrust 
between favela residents and police. 
 
While the UPP does show promise for changing the rhetoric within Brazilian police 
forces, their violent nature is not necessarily developed within the forces themselves. In 2009, 
                                                
63 Patrick Ashcroft, “History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 4: Pacifying Police Units,” RioOnWatch, May 
1, 2014, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14728. 
64 G1 Rio, “Major e 24 PMs do caso Amarildo começam a ser julgados nesta quinta,” G1, February 20, 2014, 
http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2014/02/major-e-24-pms-do-caso-amarildo-comecam-ser-julgados-nesta-
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65 Adriano Barcelos, “Polícia do Rio faz reconstituição de morte de dançarino DG em favela do Rio,” Folha de S. 
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66 Felicity Clarke, “Never Again: Maré Remembers 10 Dead in Police Operation,” RioOnWatch, July 4, 2014, 
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67 G1 Rio, “Protesto de moradores interdita via do Alemão, na Zona Norte do Rio,” G1, September 29, 2014, 
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norte-do-rio.html.  
68 Ignácio Cano (Director of LAV at UERJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014.  
69 “Families of Slain Brazilian Police Officers Ask For Tougher Penalties,” All Things Considered National Public 
Radio, February 20, 2015,  
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the Federal Secretary of Human Rights, within the federal government, found that 40% of the 
Brazilian population interviewed believed a “good criminal is a dead criminal.”70 Perhaps violent 
tendencies toward perceived “criminals” begin before an officer joins the police force. If so, 
police violence must be addressed as a reflection of larger society and then countered by police 
training and practicum to ensure police violence does not continue to rule policing practices. If 
not, police training and practices must change to transform this violent mentality grown within 
the forces themselves. 
 
Perhaps the UPP did decrease the prevalence of violent crime overall, or perhaps it 
decreased only some forms at the expense of others. Either way, the UPP does attempt to install 
a system of legitimate protection for favela residents through the “establishment an order that, 
although guaranteeing some rights at the expense of others, permits the creation of rules to 
regulate conduct, the active participation and recognition of state agents as integrators of these 
groups, [and] control of the territory and of the population that had been ruled by an irregularly 
normalized armed group.”71 Although its efforts are not perfected and must continue to evolve, 
the UPP does attempt to de-regularize the previous prevalence of violence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The UPP’s effect on violence rates proves to be a haphazard collection of evidence with 
multiple conclusions. While the UPP does target criminal groups, it mainly focuses on drug 
traffickers and effectively ignores militias, thus ignoring a large portion of the violence that 
occurs outside of Rio’s RISP 1 region. In terms of police violence, the UPP appears to be 
effective in slightly changing policing mentality through calling attention to its militarization; 
however, it has yet to produce widespread, holistic change throughout the various forces. The 
focus on violence rates over social programming also signifies the emphasis on the undeclared 
war, affirming that favelas are known for their violence above all else and militancy is the 
solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
70 Cano in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
71 Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade do Rio de 
Janeiro,” 12. 
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Chapter 6 
The Implications and Consequences Part 2: The UPP and Services 
 
 The second potential result of the UPP and territorial control, and the primary hope for 
the UPPs made clear by residents, is the provision of services to favela communities. These 
services can be broken into two categories: commercial services, as defined by increased 
consumerism and marketing to residents; and public, social services, including increased 
availability of, access to, and quality of services typically provided by the government to its 
citizens.  
 
6.1 Commercial services 
 
 The UPP opened the door to increased business and commercialized services within 
favelas. The entrance of various businesses and services has two results: 1) it has increased the 
number of options available to favela residents who were not previously provided in the favelas, 
and 2) it has increased the cost of living and contributes to the gentrification of the favelas.  
 
More options  
 
The entrance of the UPP has undeniably changed the way favela residents participate in 
Brazilian society as consumers and contributors. A study conducted by the Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas found that “23% of businesses in the five favelas [of Pavão-Pavãozinho-Cantagalo, 
Chapéu Mangueira-Babilônia, Santa Marta, Cidade de Deus and Batan] had grown since UPPs 
were installed.”1 Communities with UPPs have also received “Comérico Legal,” a program that 
brings “representatives from financial institutions, micro-entrepreneurs and local business people 
together to discuss future possible economic growth through incentives and credit lines.” Despite 
hopeful steps forward, much of the growth in favelas is within larger businesses and does not 
reflect an increased protection of small, local business.  
 
If favela residents do not yield significant disposal incomes, why do companies see favelas as 
burgeoning opportunity spaces? There are several advantages to expanding into favela markets, 
most notably the amplified exposure of their brands, the possibility of expanding their customer 
base and sales, and the possibility of creating corporate social responsibility programming that 
can actively contribute to favela development while also strengthening reputations as positive 
forces in Rio society. NBS, or “No bullshit,” is a large communications company located in 
Botafogo in Rio de Janeiro. In November 2012, NBS created a new project, called “Rio+Rio,” in 
an effort to “generate benefits for [its] clients and benefits for the communities” through “social 
business.2 Rio+Rio is installed in the Santa Marta favela because it is “located near [the NBS 
office] as they go back and forth between NBS and the Santa Marta office, and because it was 
first to be pacified, it is small, [and] it has security.” In terms of company benefits, Rio+Rio 
provides the three advantages listed above: 1) they promote their clients’ brands (for example, 
                                                
1 Andrew Willis, “UPP Favelas See 23% Business Growth,” RioTimes, October 23, 2012, 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/upp-favelas-see-23-percent-business-growth/. 
2 No Bullshit Rio+Rio Program (NBS, marketing company based in Rio de Janeiro), in discussion with the author, 
May 2014.  
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Boticário, a cosmetics company, provides professional cosmetics training to women to teach 
skills and promote their product); 2) they help sell their clients’ products to residents (to “bring 
private services to help with the creation of reintregation opportunity”); and 3) they improve 
NBS’ reputation while attempting to improve equality in the community (“NBS understands that 
private enterprise has a role in… bringing higher quality of life to disadvantaged people and 
integrating these people into Rio society”). Rio+Rio is considering expanding to another 
“pacified” favela because it can send workers to favelas with UPP presence. Perhaps the 
increased entrance of services with the possibility of increasing economic activity in favelas is a 
positive attribute of the UPPs, despite the potential consequences of gentrification.  
 
Gentrification 
 
The “pacification” of favelas has resulted in the extension of private service into favela 
market areas, including electricity, TV and wireless Internet, many of which had been previously 
pirated from other sources. These additional services intensify the cost of living in favelas that 
many residents are unable to afford. The smallest rise in prices – in bus fares, for example, which 
sparked mass protests in July 2013 before the Confederations Cup – affects the poorer classes 
more than any other socioeconomic group in society, making their daily lives significantly more 
difficult. Alongside the rest of Rio de Janeiro, property values have increased inside of favelas, 
making it more difficult for residents to maintain their standard of living in their own 
communities. The rent of barracos (“shacks” found in favelas) has increased in these areas, and 
led to a “reduction in income for many inhabitants.”3 During the interview with a carioca student, 
Phellipe Azevido, he described the change in finances for favela residents in his home 
neighborhood, Cajú.4  He described, “The same day the UPP entered [Cajú], a TV company 
entered and began to sell TVs.” After this initial shock, he explained how prices have changed: 
“In the past, restaurants cost R$2, and now the same restaurant costs R$3 or R$4. This is the 
same as prices in the South Zone… but the salaries of favela residents haven’t changed. So I 
don’t eat at restaurants in Cajú, or outside of downtown or in the South Zone. I always eat lunch 
for about R$2, so I can’t even eat lunch in my own neighborhood.” Although not a firsthand 
account, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Brazil Institute and Graciano 
Lourenço Fernandes Junior both echo these concerns with their convincing summaries of the 
potential negative economic effects of the UPP: 
 
“…With UPPs also comes the other side of the formalization: a crack down in informal 
businesses, which may hinder entrepreneurship; a rise in the cost of living since more people 
will start paying for water and electricity, as well as taxes; and, finally, gentrification because 
some people may not be able to afford living in pacified communities where rent is likely to 
appreciate in value, which is an inevitable consequence.”5 
 
                                                
3 Andrew Willis, “UPP Favelas See 23% Business Growth,” RioTimes, October 23, 2012, 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/upp-favelas-see-23-percent-business-growth/. 
4 UNIRIO students (Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Theatre Program) in a discussion with the 
author, May 2014. 
5 “Is Rio's Tough Love Strategy Against Violence Working?” Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars Brazil Institute (January 2012), 4, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Is%20Rio%27s%20Tough%20Love%20Strategy%20Against%20Vi
olence%20Working,%20Final.pdf.   
53 
 
“In contrast to self segregation, induced segregation appears in the form that some authors 
call ‘white removals,’ but we prefer to use the term ‘induced removals,’ in which residents of 
favelas where the UPPs were implemented end up leaving the favela because of the rising 
cost of living, including being unable to afford the new water prices, electricity, cable 
television, Internet (previously supplied irregularly and sometimes illegally)…”6 
 
The increased price of living in areas with UPP has many favela residents questioning 
whether they can continue to afford to live in their respective neighborhoods. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, many of the favelas with UPPs are found on hills with the most coveted real estate in 
all of Rio de Janeiro. Vidigal, the favela located on the hill called “Dois Irmaõs,” holds one of 
the most spectacular views of Ipanema beach. The induced gentrification of favelas such as 
Vidigal would open space for private business and tourism to occupy these areas and profit from 
their prime locations. Perhaps the UPP does aim to establish long-term security in current 
favelas, but this security may hope to create a new future for these areas rather than empower the 
current favela communities and their residents. 
 
Increased gentrification would also encourage tourism in favelas, generating income for 
businesses outside of the favela. Especially in the era of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 
Olympics, residents debate over services aimed to accommodate tourists and whether they 
provide commercial or social gains. The upcoming mega-events call for increased tourist 
attractions throughout the country, and favelas are a viable option for travel plans as some 
businesses now offer guided favela tours. These tours, made possible and more accessible the 
teleférico, will take tourists through the maze streets of the slums of the largest cities for a fee, 
transforming the criminalization of poverty into the spectacularization and commodification of 
poverty.7 The best example of questionable new services is the installation of the newly 
constructed cable car transportation systems in Complexo de Alemão, called the teleférico or the 
“Bondinho do Alemão.”8 The teleférico opened in the summer of 2011 and has six stations 
connecting the various neighborhoods of Alemão. Outside of the glamour of being the first and 
only mass transit system via cable car in the city, the teleférico is “used by only seven percent of 
favela residents.”9 This perhaps is related to the ticket categories, which target tourists with 
elevated prices and allow one round-trip free ticket per resident on a daily basis.10 Residents 
heavily criticize the teleférico as a tourist gimmick that promotes favela tourism within Alemão, 
attributing to a further sensationalized “valorization of urban poverty areas.”11  Despite the 
                                                
6 Graciano Lourenço Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade 
do Rio de Janeiro,” (Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, 2012), 7.  
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8 “Teleférico do Complexo do Alemão,” The Gondola Project, http://gondolaproject.com/riodejaneiro/.  
9 Catherine Osborn, “This Neighborhood Needed a Basic Sewage System – It Got a Gondola Instead,” Next City, 
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11 Malte Steinbrink, “Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging - the example of Rio de 
Janeiro,” Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 144, no. 2 (November 2013), 140, 
http://www.academia.edu/3990824/Festifavelisation_mega-events_slums_and_strategic_city-
staging_the_example_of_Rio_de_Janeiro. 
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teleférico’s intended potential, Matthew Shaer for the New York Times reports, “the recurring 
violence has kept visitors away, and the neighborhood residents preferred to use cheaper 
motorbike taxis.”12 It thus goes unused by both populations.  
 
6.2 Social Services 
 
Before the UPP, state-provided, public services did not exist in favelas. These social services 
were instead provided by non-governmental and non-profit organizations comprised of both 
favela and non-favela residents in an attempt to provide basic human needs. These groups 
included Residents’ Associations, organized within the favelas themselves, and NGOs such as 
Cidade Unia, a social movement that connects organizations from Rio’s favelas. Despite the 
existence of these advocacy groups, the government continued to underrepresent and ignore 
favelas, delegating them little say in the decisions made regarding their communities. As a result, 
many favela residents looked to the UPP as a source of hope for social programming and positive 
government attention; however, the reality is the UPP does not incorporate any social 
programming into its agenda, structure, or practices. This is visible at the most basic level within 
the UPP forces themselves, as only “33% of UPP police believed that ‘helping resolve 
infrastructure problems’ was part of their attributions.”13 As a result, Justiça Global reports “most 
occupied favelas still lack healthcare, daycare, schools, social assistance and outlets for 
recreational activities, [and] residents of occupied favelas themselves criticize these UPP 
installations by contrasting the presence of police with the absence of social programming.”14 
 
The most common misconception about the UPP is its connection with a program formerly 
known as the “UPP Social,” now named “Rio+Social.”15 Despite its former name of UPP Social, 
Rio+Social is “completely separated from the UPPs in its independent work.”16 This 
misunderstanding often leads to the conclusion that the Rio de Janeiro state UPP policing 
program incorporates social programming; however, Rio+Social only “exists alongside the UPP 
because [Rio+Social] exclusively enters into pacified areas with the UPP…but the work is very 
different, as the UPP focuses on security, and [Rio+Social] focuses on public policy for 
economic, social, and urban development of favelas.” The idea of the UPP Social originated in 
the Rio de Janeiro state government under the Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Social Welfare 
and Human Rights. The project was then handed off to the Instituto Pereira Passos (Pereira 
Passos Institute or IPP), an organization of the Rio de Janeiro municipal government, where it 
officially began as an “international technical cooperation project with UN-Habitat” and was 
                                                
12 Matthew Shaer, “‘The Media Doesn’t Care What Happens Here,’” The New York Times, February 15, 2015, 
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2012), published online November 28, 2011, 4, 
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16 Government official (preference to remain unidentified), in discussion with the author, May 2014.  
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renamed “Rio+Social” in 2014.17 As described by the current President of the IPP, Eduarda La 
Rocque, Rio+Social maintains several projects and goals: 
 
“The program generates data on risks related to the built environment, which affect living 
conditions, social cohesion and urban inequalities. A rapid participatory mapping (MRP) 
methodology is employed annually to generate information on public infrastructure and the 
quality of the built environment in pacified slums. Indicators are compiled on landslides and 
geological risks, drainage and sanitation infrastructure, street lighting and other components 
of the built environment. The program supports slum upgrading policies by providing the 
housing, civil defence and dozens of other departments with data on favela settlements and 
with access to networks and partnerships.”  
 
To accomplish these tasks, the program consists of 3 teams: 1) the territorial management 
team, who collects data on public services and operates within pacified favelas on a permanent 
basis; 2) the information management team, who processes this public service data; and 3) the 
institutional management team, who “coordinates relations and facilitates connections and 
partnerships between the various municipal government departments in order to improve the 
quality and efficiency of public expenditures in favelas.”  
  
Rio+Social has many redeemable qualities that must be more thoroughly integrated with the 
UPP. First, they set the commendable example of consistently hosting forums between the 
government and residents, sometimes incorporating UPP officers into the discussion.18 Forums, a 
key aspect of community policing methodology, would provide more contact-time between 
officers and residents, ultimately resulting in increased trust and perhaps policing practices that 
better fit the community they serve. Rio+Social also attempts to incorporate favela residents into 
their data collection and programming processes through the work of their territorial 
management teams, which most directly interacts with favela residents and works alongside 
residents by providing training while also creating a network for research and collaboration 
across favela communities experiencing pacification. By partnering with residents or utilizing 
residents themselves as UPP officers, the UPP could begin to transform into a community 
policing force comprised of members from the community itself.  
 
Although Rio+Social sets an example of government-sponsored social programming, it can 
still improve. Rio+Social only enters communities after the UPP enters and “pacifies” them. This 
fact – the primary reason for the misconception that the UPP and Rio+Social are connected – 
excludes a large portion of Rio’s favelas and correlates police action with the provision of public 
services. Instead of anticipating and thus attempting to address the lack of opportunity that 
plagues favela communities and leads to illicit economies such as drug trafficking, Rio+Social is 
a reactionary mechanism. The counterargument to this idea remains the proclaimed inability to 
enter communities that have not yet been pacified; however, by partnering with already-existent 
                                                
17 Eduarda de La Rocque and Petras Shelton-Zumpano, “The Sustainable Development Strategy of the Municipal 
Government of Rio de Janeiro” (paper presented at the “Citizen Security in Brazil: Progress and Challenges” at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., March 28, 2014), 3. 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Paper_%20La%20Rocque%20and%20Shelton-
Zumpano_2014_0.pdf. 
18 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 145. 
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organizations in favelas without the UPP, Rio+Social could begin to enter communities and 
provide social programming before the arrival of the UPP.  
 
In addition, Rio+Social can further emphasize the importance of art and culture in pacified 
and non-pacified favelas alike. Unfortunately, the arrival of the UPP into favela communities 
often signals a halt in art production and cultural activities, including baile funk dances, graffiti, 
and other forms of art created by residents. Adrina Facina, a professor at the Federal University 
of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) who studies cultural production in favelas, expressed frustration at the 
declining cultural production in “pacified” communities. She described the UPP as an 
“obstacle…even though people continue to produce art because they are resistant and because it 
is important in their lives. But it is difficult because of the vigilance and the censorship” that 
exists in pacified communities.19 This declining production is associated with the prohibition of 
cultural activities inside pacified favelas, including baile funk dances – which were banned 
because they are “historically connected to the prejudice of the criminalization of favelas” – and 
“popular forms of relaxation in the favela, the majority of which utilize public spaces, the street, 
street corners…because these characteristics are part of the social life of the favelas.” Other 
forms of art have also been erased, including the destruction of graffiti art and a well-known 
staircase art piece in Complexo de Alemão. Professor Facina associates these restrictions on art 
to the “negative vision of the UPP in Complexo de Alemão,” as residents now link the UPP with 
the “repression of cultural events, artistic production, the lack of security that began with assaults 
in the community, robberies, and the continuing presence of the drug trade… [all] events that did 
not happen before the UPP.” 
 
Community-driven art proves itself a worthwhile venture in Projeto Morrinho, an arts project 
created by several favela youth in the Vila Pereira da Silva (also called Pereirão) favela. Projeto 
Morrinho, or “the small favela project,” is comprised of hundreds of painted bricks arranged in a 
representation of a favela community. The project has received international coverage from 
National Geographic magazine and continues to build upon its project with increasing 
collaboration with favela youths, providing an avenue to criticize and highlight the life of living 
in a favela.20 While many youth want to represent daily life, the founders of the project aim to 
redirect the project away from focusing on the undeniable violence that dictates the lives of 
many residents, as they believe “you already see so much violence on TV, drug trafficking, [and] 
war,” so they instead encourage youth to “represent other things, to represent romance, people in 
love, if you go to a baile funk dance and you see a girl…make this story.”21 The founders see 
themselves as a “positive focus” for their favela and other favelas. Projeto Morrinho is also 
unique in that Vila Pereira da Silva is not occupied by the UPP, despite its location in the South 
Zone. In fact, the founder described the relationship between the project and the police as “very 
distant, because we do not mix with either the police or drug traffickers.”  
 
In terms of the Rio de Janeiro state UPP policing strategy, the UPP does not incorporate nor 
embrace social programming into its agenda or practices. To transform from proximity to 
community police forces, the UPP can learn from and collaborate with Rio+Social to provide 
                                                
19 Adrina Facina (Professor of Anthropology at UFRJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
20 Shannon Stowell, “Brazil for the Cultural Adventurer,” National Geographic, October 19, 2012, 
http://adventureblog.nationalgeographic.com/2012/10/19/brazil-for-the-cultural-adventurer/.  
21 Projeto Morrinho Founder, in discussion with the author, May 2014.  
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more basic services, dialogue with favela members, and thus gain the trust of and gain respect for 
residents to more thoroughly serve their needs. Until this point, the UPP has focused more 
heavily on violence rates over the provision of services because it is “easier to quantify violent 
deaths than to measure social needs and how much they’re being met.”22 Perhaps “setting up 
police pacification units (guys with guns in snappy uniforms, who’ve had six months’ training) 
looks a great deal easier than mapping and meeting needs for trash collection, health care, public 
lighting, education, day care, legal aid, and so much else,” but there is value for both the UPP 
and Rio+Social in collaboration as each would work to better their relationships with residents 
while simultaneously improving the lives of residents. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the entrance of new services, commercial services require additional payment for 
the same services that were previously free, and the majority of the growth occurring inside 
favelas still remains in the hands of outsider big businesses. In terms of social services, the UPP 
does not offer social programming and could learn from the Rio municipal government’s 
program, Rio+Social, to more thoroughly incorporate and provide public services to the 
communities it serves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Julia Michaels, “New Rio de Janeiro Police Force Reduces Favela Violence,” InSight Crime, August 8, 2012, 
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Conclusion: Evaluating the UPP 
 
6.1 Success or failure? 
 
 To define the UPP as a success or a failure, we must identify in what aspect we are 
conducting the evaluation. As a multi-faceted project attempting to target a complicated and 
historically significant issue of police violence and marginalization, the UPP cannot and does not 
simply “succeed” or “fail.” My initial research sought to discover how the UPP affects the 
relationship between the favelas and the government, and how this possible change in 
relationship affects the undeclared war and the possible integration of favelas into Rio society. 
My first question addresses whether UPPs improve the relationship between the government and 
the favelas with several factors:  
 
• Does the UPP improve the relationship because it improves the lives of favela 
residents through decreased violence?  
• Does the UPP improve the lives of residents through better policing practices in 
which residents are involved?  
• Does the UPP improve the lives of residents through establishing the government has 
a stake in favela communities? 
 
Respectively, the UPP does not necessarily improve the lives of residents with less 
violence; the UPP does improve upon previous policing practices and perhaps impacts the 
mentality and actions of the police; and the UPP does establish the government’s stake in the 
communities, but not necessarily because it cares about residents as much as it cares about its 
international reputation as a tourist destination. 
 
The second factor concerns how this change in relationship can impact two potential 
goals of the UPP: to eliminate the rhetoric of or end the undeclared war itself, and to integrate 
favela residents as recognized and valued members of Rio. Considering the change in 
relationship between the government and the favelas is minimal, the tangible yields so far are 
also minimal. Yet the yields are also much greater than they were before the UPP due to the 
increased public awareness of these issues. In a way never before acknowledged or supported by 
the state government, the war between the government and the favelas is recognized and even 
defined as a problem. In terms of favela integration, people from the asfalto are more aware of 
the marginalization of favelas while others are taking conscious steps toward better integration. 
The societal position of the favela seems to be shifting as more cariocas recognize the necessity 
of favelas, their residents, and their cultures as an integral part of what makes Rio, Rio. Although 
the international media does not accurately report on the UPP, the UPP has drawn attention to 
the favelas and led to critical analysis of the policies and stigmas affecting the residents. Perhaps 
these impacts are not yet tangible; but perhaps they demonstrate the beginning of a slow and 
gradual, albeit still painful, process of integration.  
 
Overall, the structure of the UPPs does not attempt to remedy the legacy of the Military 
Police or significantly improve its policing strategies. As a result, the UPP has various negative 
implications and consequences in its implementation that inevitably detract from the possible 
positive change in the relationship between the government and the favelas. The UPP has not 
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countered the war between these two actors, but has instead made itself an extension of the 
government with slightly less militarization. The message of the UPP does not ring out clearly as 
peaceful, and therefore does not drive a peacekeeping mission. Instead, it poses itself as a 
temporary security force necessary for the upcoming mega-events, created and maintained only 
to protect the Brazilian elite alongside international tourists. In the wake, the well being of favela 
residents and their needs are sacrificed once again as the government’s attention turns to its own 
interests. Despite the program’s shortcomings, the UPP opened up a public discourse about 
police practices and their impact on favela residents. As a result, residents can now showcase 
their opposition through open resistance and promote their own participation in civil society 
through voicing their complaints and demands. The UPP was and continues to be a necessary 
program to strengthen ties between the government and favelas, but it must continue as a longer-
term strategy to yield any significant and transformative results. The UPP must learn from these 
first eight years and continue to evolve, incorporating suggestions from favela residents.  
  
6.2 Recommendations 
 
In 2011, Cano optimistically evaluated the state of the UPP: “The ultimate criteria is, is 
the life of the people who live in these communities better than it used to be? And the answer is 
clearly yes. Is it perfect? The answer is clearly no. Can it be improved? Absolutely. So the 
question is how can we make it better.” The latter part of this evaluation stands true in 2015, as 
we optimistically assume the continuation of the UPP and then attempt to improve it. I have 
three main recommendations for the UPP program: to redefine the program and its objectives, to 
change policing methodology, and to extend the UPP program. All of these recommendations 
aim to strengthen the conceptualization, the implementation, and the prevalence of negative 
implications and consequences currently associated with the UPP program. 
 
Redefine program and objectives 
 
 The UPP must redefine itself from a temporary security strategy to a long-term 
commitment to favela residents. The UPP must first define itself as its own branch of the police 
force, removing itself from under the control of the Military Police. With this move, the Military 
Police must also de-militarize and agree the UPP is the primary representative of the government 
in favela communities. As its own unit, the UPP will remove itself from the competitive nature 
of the Brazilian police force as a whole, separating itself from the hedonic treadmill of corruption 
and payouts that encourage inefficiency and ineffectiveness among the police. The UPP must 
then redefine its objectives from maintaining current policing practices and dedicating itself to 
community-based service based on the input from the favela communities themselves. Instead of 
defining themselves as “peacekeepers,” the UPP must see itself as the representatives and 
protectorates of favela residents with the goal to provide quality services to these populations. As 
opportunities in favelas and trust in the government and its forces increase, the UPP will become 
an ingrained and highly valued part of favelas. Alongside their roles in favelas themselves, the 
UPP must designate itself as the future model of Brazilian police forces as a whole and work 
toward changing police mentalities through their example. The UPP then becomes more than a 
community police force; it becomes a force within the police themselves that advocates for better 
policing practices.  
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Change policing methods 
 
The UPP must reconsider one of the most basic elements at its conception: proximity 
policing. The UPP must begin the process of converting from proximity policing to community 
policing practices. The current state of proximity policing as exercised by the UPP maintains a 
relationship between officer and resident based on fear and impunity. To effectively gain the 
trust and showcase the mutual respect between the UPP and the favelas they serve, police 
officers must first recognize their positions as servants of the community, rather than donos of 
the territory. To convert to community policing, the UPP must actively organize and participate 
in public forums to exchange dialogue between residents and officers, draw future officers from 
the communities themselves, organize and provide social programming and public services 
provisioned by the state, and be trained to understand the marginalization of favela residents 
before entering into their communities. More consistent and honest feedback between officers 
and residents will incorporate residents into the public security process, giving them agency and 
the ability to voice their concerns and needs. With this information, UPP officers can more 
accurately provide the appropriate services and thus establish relationships with the 
communities. 
 
 The most important of these tasks – that will inevitably influence and strengthen the other 
jobs expected of a community policing force – is to provide and engage in social programming. 
These public services will build trust between officers and residents, more thoroughly integrate 
officers into communities, and provide necessary and previously nonexistent amenities and 
activities for favela residents. The UPP police strategy must either partner with or learn from the 
Rio+Social program provided by the Rio municipal government, adopting the collaborative 
approach that incorporates residents into the decision-making and information dissemination 
processes. These social programs must not be an after thought to pacification, but rather precede 
pacification to begin providing the necessary services. Whether or not pacification is scheduled 
in a specific community, the state government of Rio de Janeiro must establish itself as a 
government supportive of the favelas through social programming and public services. By 
setting this precedent, perhaps favela communities themselves will more actively protest against 
their donos and demand government presence. This demand will not only reaffirm the 
government’s policies and practices, but will also showcase a newfound confidence in the 
government that has not and does not exist throughout favelas.  
 
Extend the UPP program 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, the UPP has clear focus areas based on the 2014 FIFA World 
Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. These focuses included certain regions of Rio de Janeiro and 
a specific timeline of implementation. Both of these focuses must expand in order to generate 
real change through the UPP. First, the UPP must extend its reach beyond the RISP 1 region of 
Rio de Janeiro. Instead of targeting communities that are closely located to tourist attractions, the 
UPP must emphasize its focus on the most violent communities to validate its goal to decrease 
violence rates in the state. By only focusing on territories occupied by drug traffickers located in 
the South Zone, the UPP largely ignores the extortion and violence occurring in communities 
outside of the city’s center. This strategy essentially designates which areas of the city are off 
limits to violence, while demarking the regions where violence and criminality will be ignored 
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and tolerated. The UPP must begin to acknowledge and then target criminal groups outside of the 
expected drug trafficking rhetoric, most notably militias, and catalyze anti-corruption campaigns 
within the police and within the political system. Outside of the actual locations of UPP forces, 
the UPP must also extend to acknowledge the complicating factor of scale in its expansion 
within larger communities, such as Complexo do Alemão, Rocinha, and Complexo da Maré. 
When the pacification process plans to enter large communities, it must account for this 
expansion and be flexible to change its policies as the process unravels. The current UPP process 
does conceptually allow for this space; however, the implementation realistically does not. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Within the few pacified communities, perhaps the most basic question is the best to ask: are 
the favelas better off now with the UPP than they were before, without the UPP? Again, it 
depends: the UPP does not immediately – or even in the first five years of implementation – 
generate positive change in the favelas across Rio; however, in the longer-term outlook of the 
city, the UPP was a necessary step in the right direction of integrating favelas into the folds of 
larger society. In the short-term, the UPP raises the possibility that perhaps life is better in some 
favelas. In Santa Marta, the UPP has caused positive change and security. As Cano describes, 
“We are not in an ideal situation but any stretch of the imagination, but we have to compare to 
what we had before. What we had before is people being killed regularly, shoot outs occurring 
every day, people being afraid of taking their kids to school, people being unable to go back 
home. So compared to that, it's a huge success. But if you compare it to policemen in Denmark, 
of course it's not a big success.” For the residents of Santa Marta, this change is palpable; 
however, in Complexo da Maré, the UPP has generated a stronger presence of war than had 
before between its rival criminal factions. To improve the experiences of favela communities 
with the UPP and communities without the UPP, the UPP must become a long-term strategy. 
 
If the UPP continues past its current termination date in late summer of 2016, after the 
completion of the 2016 Olympic Games, it has the potential to convert this newfound focus on 
policing and effort to change practices into actual change within or through the UPP, or incite 
other activists to push for more sustainable change in other sectors of society. The masses remain 
skeptical of this possibility. Many – including 70% of UPP officers interviewed by Cano – 
believe the UPPs are “temporary” and were created only to provide security for the World Cup 
and the Olympics.1 If the UPP does indeed terminate as soon as the Olympics finish, the 
possibility of long-term change no longer exists. I agree with one interviewee, who described 
pacification as “a process of twenty, thirty years. It is forming a new generation.”2 To be 
effective, the UPP must continue, but not necessarily indefinitely. To eradicate the problems of 
police violence and marginalization built successively over the past fifty to one hundred years, 
the UPP needs to continue to evolve over a sustained period of time beyond the original eight 
years allotted for the program. This promise of commitment will not only change the landscape 
                                                
1 Mauricio Moura, “UPP's (Pacifying Police Units): Game Changer?” (paper presented at the “Is Rio’s Tough Love 
Strategy Against Violence Working?” at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., 
December 13, 2011). Barbara Musumeci Soares, Julita Lemgruber, Leonarda Musumeci, and Silvia Ramos, 
“Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” (May 2011), 17. 
2 No Bullshit Rio+Rio Program (NBS, marketing company based in Rio de Janeiro), in discussion with the author, 
May 2014. 
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of police practices, but it will change the relationship between favelas and the government as the 
government declares itself as a long-term investor in the future of the favelas and their residents. 
Under these conditions, residents may attempt to incorporate the UPP into their communities and 
criminal groups will be forced to permanently disband or relocate. Without commitment, 
violence will continue as residents push against policy they believe is temporary, and criminal 
groups prepare to reenter into their previous territories. 
 
6.3 UPP as a Model 
 
 Why is the UPP even being considered as a potential model? Cano explains the UPP as 
“an innovative… almost revolutionary… model within the police,” but is this true?3 Some blame 
the Brazilian government’s “glossy exhibition” of the UPP as “something miraculous” that can 
be sold to other countries.4 Others blame the professional image management of the program for 
the widespread attention:  
 
“[The UPP] runs its own press office as well as a well-maintained website… which 
provides information on current developments – in English, too! In addition, UPP police 
officers are trained in media relations. Journalists, social scientists and foreign 
delegations are welcome to visit UPP stations, where they are supplied with information 
(on the programme’s achievements). This intensive public-relations work has given rise 
to the predominantly positive news reports. In the media, UPP police officers are 
presented as close to the community, helpful and friendly. One key visual motif is that of 
officers posing with children – often displaying a tender and caring physical contact.”5 
 
Despite all this noise, is the UPP really a model and, if so, a model of what? The UPP 
could be a model of an attempt to revolutionize policing practices from the inside out. It could be 
a model for sparking the discussion of the provision of public security as a fundamental right of a 
nation’s citizens. It could be a model for slum integration into emerging market economies with 
the use of the police. It could be a model for a strategy to decrease violence in areas with 
abnormally high rates. If the UPP is to be used as a model, most importantly, it must be seen as 
an incomplete version. The UPP is an effective model only if it used as a reference to construct 
another model or as inspiration; however, its direct replication and application would be 
anachronistic. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is a specific location with a specific history and thus a 
specific set of problems. Ignácio Cano further explains the specific circumstances of Rio that 
make the UPP potentially untranslatable:  
 
“I think [making the UPP a model] only makes sense when you have heavy gunfire, when 
you have a lot of shoot outs, and you have territorial control by armed groups. In this 
                                                
3 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 143. 
4 Ignácio Cano (Director of the LAV at UERJ), in discussion with Rio Radar, August 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdhE. 
5 Malte Steinbrink, “Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging - the example of Rio de 
Janeiro,” Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 144, no. 2 (November 2013), 137, 
http://www.academia.edu/3990824/Festifavelisation_mega-events_slums_and_strategic_city-
staging_the_example_of_Rio_de_Janeiro.  
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circumstance, I think it's a good strategy. In all other circumstances, I think it is very 
expensive and not very efficient strategy. For example, if you have a death squad, they 
don't patrol the entrances of the favela, they don't ask you who you are when you come 
in, they go at night and they kill whoever they think they have to kill. So having 
policemen walking up and down will not alter, it will be very expensive and will 
probably not hinder their ability to kill. So, just an example to say it makes full sense 
given these conditions. In any other, probably not the best strategy... because it's 
expensive and it does not cover all types of crimes.”6  
 
What works in the favelas will not necessarily work in other mega slums around the 
world, such as in the kampongs of Jakarta; in Neza-Chalco-Itza in Mexico City; in Dharavi in 
Mumbai; or in Orangi Town in Karachi, Sindh. The UPP, as one of the first of its kind, does 
initialize a movement to integrate slums into their surrounding societies and right the historic 
distance between the government and Brazil’s poor that can be translated to other regions and 
countries. The UPP has yet to officially break the undeclared war occurring in Rio de Janeiro, 
but its goals of peace, with time, may slowly result in a more accurate reality of peacetime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Ignácio Cano (Director of LAV at UERJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014. 
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